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INTRODUCTION

I

N 1995, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia1 held that the University of Virginia
had violated the Constitution when it distributed money to student
organizations but refused to fund “religious activities.” Nine years
later, in Locke v. Davey,2 the Supreme Court appeared to contradict itself. It held that the state of Washington had not violated the
Constitution in denying scholarship money to students of devotional theology, while providing scholarships to students in all
other disciplines. These cases seem at best conflicted and at worst
unprincipled. This Note explores the doctrinal confusion, which in
many ways began with Rosenberger, and seeks to bring clarity to
the jurisprudence.
The Court in Rosenberger found that the University, by inviting
a plethora of student organizations to partake of an activities fund
and contribute to the life of the University, had created a limited
public forum in which all viewpoints were welcome. Allowing religious speech was part of the bargain. In the rare instance when the
government creates a public forum—a venue for free speech by
private individuals—the government is not allowed to disfavor any
viewpoints, including religious ones. Since Rosenberger, the Supreme Court and lower courts have read the case narrowly and
1
2

515 U.S. 819 (1995).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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treated it as only a public forum case. But this is not the only, or
even the most natural, reading of Rosenberger.
This Note explores the idea that the Court in Rosenberger went
further and announced a broad principle of nondiscrimination
against religion. While public fora had traditionally involved
places, such as streets and parks, Rosenberger extended the logic
into the realm of funding schemes. This move could have obliterated a distinction that the Court had long drawn between places
and funding schemes. Public fora have always been at one end of
the spectrum. They are places in which the government must behave with utmost neutrality because streets and parks are quintessential places where citizens may speak freely. At the other end of
the spectrum are funding decisions that the government makes.
The government has always enjoyed wide latitude over what it
chooses to fund and, just as significantly, what it chooses not to
fund. Courts have almost uniformly ignored the proverbial elephant in the room: Rosenberger was a funding case. The Court in
Rosenberger applied the stringent criteria of the public forum doctrine to a funding decision, an area in which the government’s discretion is usually at its apex. In addition to exploring the idea that
Rosenberger was a funding case—though this is not the dominant
reading of the opinion—this Note also discusses the nondiscrimination principle possibly announced by the Court.
If Rosenberger does embody a broad nondiscrimination principle, there are two other lines of doctrine that, at first blush, stand
in tension with such a principle. One line of precedent involves the
theory of “play in the joints,” the notion that there is a gap between what the Establishment Clause forbids and what the Free
Exercise Clause requires. Davey was the first Supreme Court case
to endorse “play in the joints” in an actual holding. The concept of
a gap between the two Religion Clauses is in some ways intuitive,
even though the Court has not systematically developed the theory. For instance, legislative prayer is permissible under the Establishment Clause; however, someone cannot demand, on the
strength of the Free Exercise Clause, that a legislature support
such prayers. The other precedents that potentially stand in tension
with a broad nondiscrimination principle are the funding cases. In
many ways, the traditional latitude that the government has over
funding decisions is most difficult to square with Rosenberger.
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This Note critically examines the three lines of precedent and
argues that, despite their apparent tension, they are reconcilable
and can usefully balance competing values. Part I analyzes Rosenberger and the broad nondiscrimination principle that derives from
it. Part II examines the theory of “play in the joints,” which almost
surely will constitute Davey’s most enduring legacy, and the extent
to which the theory had been a fixture of Religion Clauses doctrine
before Davey. Largely owing to the recentness of Davey, scholars
have not yet addressed this question. Part III explores the funding
cases and the wide discretion that they generally afford to the government. Part IV then triangulates the three lines of precedent, arguing that a broad nondiscrimination principle can coexist with
both a theory of “play in the joints” and the premises of the funding cases. Despite the ability to reconcile the three lines of cases,
courts have assumed that they must choose one of the precedents
to govern any given problem. Part IV analyzes how courts have
treated each line of cases, including how courts have unsatisfyingly
cabined Rosenberger as nothing more than a public forum case.
I. ROSENBERGER, THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE, AND A BROAD
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
A broad nondiscrimination principle is potentially discernible
from the Supreme Court’s language in Rosenberger. This Part assesses whether the logic of the public forum doctrine, especially as
presented in Rosenberger, applies outside of the forum context,
thereby creating a broad principle of nondiscrimination against religion. Of particular relevance is the academic commentary after
Rosenberger that discussed the reach of the public forum doctrine.
This Part concludes that a broad nondiscrimination principle readily derives from Rosenberger; however, as Parts II and III discuss,
other lines of precedent necessarily restrict the expansiveness of
the principle.
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A. Rosenberger
1. Rosenberger’s Public Forum Holding
Rosenberger involved the distribution of funds to student organizations at the University of Virginia. Wide Awake Publications
(“WAP”) was a student group3 primarily engaged in publishing
Wide Awake, a journal4 dedicated to offering a Christian perspective on contemporary issues.5 Certain student organizations were
allowed to apply for funding from the Student Activities Fund
(“SAF”) in accordance with the University Guidelines.6 The
Guidelines, however, delineated certain endeavors to which SAF
monies could not be directed, including “religious” and “political”
activities as well as other activities that would have jeopardized the
University’s tax-exempt status.7 WAP applied for SAF funds in or3
WAP was registered as a “Contracted Independent Organization” (“CIO”). Any
student group that met certain minimal prerequisites was eligible to register as a CIO.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823.
4
The Fourth Circuit noted WAP’s objection to defining Wide Awake as a “journal,”
preferring instead the word “perspective.” Nomenclature aside, WAP operated
analogously to other student-run publications. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 272 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994).
5
WAP’s stated purposes included “publishing a magazine of philosophical and religious expression,” “facilitating discussion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity
to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,” and “providing a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.” Id. at 271–72. This language is still in WAP’s
charter on file with the University. Constitution of Wide Awake Productions, art. 1,
http://www.virginia.edu/newcombhall/sac/search_display_constitution.php?org_id=17
2 (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
6
The University maintained the SAF, to which each student contributed a mandatory fee of $14 per semester, in order to promote an array of activities “related to the
educational purpose of the University.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824. During the
1990–91 academic year, 343 CIOs were registered at the University. Of these, 135 applied for SAF funding, and 118 organizations actually received funding. Fifteen of
those 118 organizations were student publications, but according to WAP founder
Ronald Rosenberger, none of the fifteen journals provided a “forum for Christian expression,” a void that Wide Awake sought to fill. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271–72.
7
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825. The Supreme Court noted that only electioneering
and lobbying came under the rubric of unfundable “political activities,” whereas funding was theoretically available to organizations that espoused a particular political
viewpoint or ideology. By contrast, SAF monies were not available for any “religious
activity,” which the Guidelines defined as an activity that “primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Id. Although
some organizations with religious trappings did receive funding, the University argued
that those organizations qualified as “cultural organizations.” Brief for Respondents
at 5–6, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (No. 94-329). The difference, according to the Uni-
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der to cover $5862 in printing costs, but the University rejected the
request on the grounds that WAP had sought funding for a religious activity.8 Ronald Rosenberger, the founder of WAP, challenged the University Guidelines as a violation of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s decision rested primarily on the conclusion that the University of Virginia had created a limited public forum and, therefore, could not exclude potential participants based
on their viewpoint. In essence, the University compelled students
to contribute to the SAF and thereby sought to foster a diversity of
viewpoints, a goal consistent with the University’s mission of providing secular education.9
The public forum doctrine is an exception to the axiom that the
Free Speech Clause confers only negative rights.10 While the First
Amendment prohibits governmental interference with free speech,
it does not create an entitlement to governmental support. Since
1939, though, the Supreme Court has recognized that government
ownership of property does not entail an unfettered right to exclude speech.11 Certain government property, such as streets and
parks, has become a “public forum” by virtue of its historical pedigree as a venue for the expression of ideas.12

versity, was that “[k]ey elements of [religious] activities are religious observances and
proselytizing.” Id. at 6; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Rosenberger, 515
U.S. 819 (No. 94-329). The University argued credibly that organizations engaged in
academic discussion—regarding politics or religion—do serve the University’s mission
of pursuing truth, whereas organizations that presume their conclusions to be correct
(such as political or religious advocacy organizations) are fundamentally different.
Despite the elegance of this distinction, the Court in Rosenberger placed great weight
on the Guidelines’ own definition of “religious activity,” which seemed overinclusive.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840.
8
The Student Council initially rejected the request, and on appeal the University’s
Student Activities Committee affirmed the Student Council’s decision. Rosenberger,
18 F.3d at 273–74.
9
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840–41.
10
For a succinct overview of the development of the public forum doctrine, see
Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories,
1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 81–96.
11
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
12
See id. at 515–16 (observing, in a plurality opinion, that certain public property
has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions”). Professor Kalven coined the phrase “public forum”

TRAMMELL_BOOK

2006]

11/15/2006 7:19 PM

The Cabining of Rosenberger

1963

The modern era of public forum analysis recognizes three or
four types of public fora, depending on who is counting. At one
end of the spectrum is a traditional public forum, which the government can regulate only in rare situations. At the other end is the
nonpublic forum, which the government has the most latitude to
regulate. In between are designated and limited public fora.13 Although the Supreme Court has been less than clear in defining this
sliding scale, all fora share one thing in common—the requirement
of viewpoint neutrality. Even when the government may limit a forum to certain classes of speakers or to certain subject matters, it
may never discriminate in a forum based on someone’s viewpoint
or perspective.14 For purposes of this Note, the precise contours of
to describe such property. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox
v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 11–12.
13
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n established the initial tripartite
formulation of traditional public fora, designated public fora, and nonpublic fora. 460
U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). In traditional public fora, any regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 45. In nonpublic fora, regulations are
permissible if they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 46. The jurisprudence
surrounding these categories is relatively settled. The middle ground is where controversy and confusion have characterized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, lower
court opinions, and academic commentary. For instance, it is unclear whether “designated public forum” and “limited public forum” are interchangeable terms. The Ninth
Circuit aptly summarized this point of confusion: “Some courts and commentators
refer to a ‘designated public forum’ as a ‘limited public forum’ and use the terms interchangeably. But they are not the same, at least not in this circuit.” Hopper v. City
of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). In a related vein, the Supreme Court has
occasionally treated limited fora as a subset of designated fora and at other times has
regarded limited fora as a subset of nonpublic fora. Compare Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001) (treating Perry, which involved a nonpublic forum, as a limited public forum case) with Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 791 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (treating limited public fora as a subset
of designated public fora). Finally, it is unclear what kinds of regulations are permissible in this middle ground. Compare BeVier, supra note 10, at 92–93 (arguing that
subject-matter restrictions are permissible in nonpublic fora but not in designated
public fora) with Douglas Laycock, Comment: Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 221 (2004) (“Designated . . . forums can be open to private
speakers but may be limited by subject matter or speaker identity.”).
14
One of the principal debates between the majority and dissenters in Rosenberger
concerned whether the exclusion of “religious activities” from eligibility for the SAF
constituted viewpoint discrimination or a legitimate subject-matter restriction. In any
forum, even a nonpublic forum, viewpoint discriminatory restrictions are unconstitutional. Justice Souter, in dissent, noted that certain subject-matter distinctions are
permissible in limited public fora: “In a limited-access forum, a speech restriction
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the forum categories are not critical. Instead, the focus is on the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality and, specifically, whether it extends beyond the public forum analysis into other areas of government action.
In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that the University had
created a limited public forum. Although the SAF constituted “a
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense,” the Court held that the same governing principles should
obtain.15 Here the Court quickly elided from geographic fora, like
public school facilities,16 to so-called metaphysical fora, which create audiences, in a very abstract sense, through the expenditure of
generally available money. Despite the Court’s seemingly logical
progression, the gap between geography and metaphysics is quite
wide. In public forum cases, the Court had traditionally concerned
itself with places, rather than means, of communication. As discussed below, the Court had historically drawn a critical distinction
between places and funding schemes, yet Rosenberger blurred that
distinction.
2. The Textual Basis for a Broad Nondiscrimination Principle
What this Note terms Rosenberger’s broad nondiscrimination
principle derives textually from the Fourth Circuit opinion and the
Supreme Court’s response to it. In no uncertain terms, the Fourth
must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum as well as viewpoint
neutral.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 893 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Justice Souter posited that the essence of viewpoint discrimination is the skewing of public debate. To the extent that the University excluded an entire subject matter from the SAF—religious activities—such a limitation
did not entail viewpoint discrimination. The University, in the dissenters’ view,
treated all religious perspectives equally and thus did not skew the public debate. Id.
at 894–96. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority rejected this approach. While
conceding that the line between viewpoint and more general content-based discrimination is somewhat murky, the Court held that the University had engaged in viewpoint discrimination. The University Guidelines did not single out specific religions,
but the Guidelines’ exclusion did skew public debate by permitting funding for secular, but not religious, perspectives. Id. at 830–32 (majority opinion). For an argument
that the majority unhelpfully blurred the distinction between subject-matter and
viewpoint-based distinctions, see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 697, 707–08 (1996).
15
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
16
See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393
(1993).
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Circuit held that the University’s policy of excluding religious activities from eligibility for SAF funding involved viewpoint dis17
crimination; however, the Fourth Circuit found that a countervailing constitutional value, embodied in the Establishment Clause,
18
ultimately justified the Guidelines’ exclusionary policy. The Supreme Court seemed to accept the Fourth Circuit’s premises but
found that making Wide Awake eligible for SAF funds would not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause. At least within the public
forum context, only an actual Establishment Clause violation could
19
justify facially disparate treatment of religious perspectives.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the University had engaged in
viewpoint discrimination when it made religious commentary ineligible for SAF funding.20 The court emphasized that while the University was under no compulsion to provide funding for student organizations, SAF funds, once generally available, “must be
distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner, absent considerations of
equal constitutional dignity.”21 Even though the Fourth Circuit
found that the University had not created a public forum,22 viewpoint neutrality was still presumptively required.23
Despite finding that the Guidelines entailed viewpoint discrimination, the Fourth Circuit noted that the restrictions could be justifiable if they served a compelling state interest and were narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose. The court held that avoiding a
violation of the Establishment Clause was a compelling state interest and that the University would have violated the Establishment
Clause if WAP had been eligible for SAF funding.24 “Using public
funds to support a publication so clearly engaged in the propagation of particular religious doctrines would constitute a patent Establishment Clause violation.”25

17

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 281 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 287.
19
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46.
20
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 280–81.
21
Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
22
Id. at 278–79.
23
Id. at 280–81.
24
Id. at 281–82, 285. Importantly, the Fourth Circuit found that the University
Guidelines neither evinced an impermissible purpose (that is, hostility toward religion) nor inhibited the practice of religion. Id. at 284–85.
25
Id. at 285.
18
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The Supreme Court opinion in Rosenberger never explicitly articulated that only an actual Establishment Clause violation can
justify abridgement of other First Amendment freedoms. In light
of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, however, the Supreme Court decision takes on added significance. Justice Kennedy, in the final
paragraph of the majority opinion, stated in relevant part:
To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the
University to deny eligibility to student publications because of
their viewpoint. The neutrality commanded of the State by the
separate Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by
the University’s course of action. . . . There is no Establishment
Clause violation in the University’s honoring its duties under the
26
Free Speech Clause.

The Supreme Court’s language is interesting for two reasons. First,
and most obviously, it signals that a nondiscrimination principle
might apply not only to the Free Speech Clause but to the Free
Exercise Clause as well. The remainder of this Part grapples with
the validity of that construction. Second, and somewhat less obviously, the underlying premise of Justice Kennedy’s statement
stands in contrast to the idea that the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause are in tension. Instead of treating the Religion Clauses as a minefield of contradictory commands, as the Court
had done for decades and as Chief Justice Rehnquist later did in
Locke v. Davey,27 Justice Kennedy appeared to regard them as being in a symbiotic relationship.28 According to this view, the various
clauses of the First Amendment do not necessarily conflict; rather,
they articulate a standard of neutrality that the state must observe.29 When the government scrupulously respects the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, it behaves neutrally with re26

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46.
540 U.S. at 718.
28
See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the
Future of State Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 Tulsa L.
Rev. 227, 245–46 (2004) (criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of the
tension in the Religion Clauses).
29
The Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses read as follows:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. Const.
amend. I.
27
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spect to religion, such that the Establishment Clause is not even
implicated. Thus, under at least some circumstances, there are no
competing interests that courts have to balance.
What is also striking about both the Fourth Circuit and Supreme
Court opinions is the two courts’ agreement that the University
had engaged in viewpoint, not just subject-matter, discrimination.30
By implication, they also agreed that the exclusion of religious activities from SAF eligibility could rest only on the need to preserve
a countervailing constitutional value. The Fourth Circuit implied
that only an Establishment Clause violation would satisfy this requirement. Justice Kennedy and the majority apparently agreed,
such that the real debate between the two courts was whether the
University would in fact have run afoul of the Establishment
Clause by allowing WAP to receive SAF funds. The Supreme
Court answered this question in the negative. Only an actual Establishment Clause violation would have justified differential treatment of religious organizations and the perspectives that they articulated. The Supreme Court believed that this query was
dispositive of the case, refusing to leave open a cliff effects argument whereby the University could justify differential treatment of
religious groups in order to steer clear of potential Establishment
Clause violations. After Rosenberger, there appeared to be no
“play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and the
other First Amendment rights.31
The textual basis for a nondiscrimination principle thus derives
from two aspects of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger.
First, excluding religion from the forum was not just a subject30

Before both courts, the University lost on the question of whether it had simply
precluded an entire subject matter from SAF eligibility. At the Fourth Circuit,
though, the University won on the question of whether the Establishment Clause justified this exclusion. Somewhat tellingly, the University abandoned its Establishment
Clause argument before the Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing that the Court
would find the argument unpersuasive. Instead, the University focused on the subjectmatter exclusion argument in hopes that it would prove more persuasive before the
Supreme Court. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 14, for an insightful criticism of
both courts’ conclusion that the University had drawn viewpoint, not just subjectmatter, distinctions.
31
Cf. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718 (holding that the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause “are frequently in tension” and that the Supreme Court has long recognized “room for play in the joints between them” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970))).
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matter restriction; instead, it was viewpoint discrimination. Second,
including religious voices in the forum would not have violated the
Establishment Clause. Consequently, there was no countervailing
constitutional interest that could have justified viewpoint discrimination. As the following Sections discuss, the fact that the Court
advanced this logic in a funding case, far beyond the context of a
pure public forum, ultimately gives rise to the idea that Rosenberger announced a broad nondiscrimination principle.
B. Preliminary Concerns About Locating a Broad
Nondiscrimination Principle in Rosenberger
Before delving further into the arguments for discerning a broad
nondiscrimination principle from Rosenberger, this Section addresses two preliminary objections in order to establish that there
is at least a colorable argument in favor of a nondiscrimination
principle. First, a nondiscrimination principle, as entertained here,
is not unqualified. It would not inflate the Free Exercise Clause
into a guarantor of any entitlements. One axiom of the Free Exercise Clause is that it does not grant individuals the right to any affirmative support from the state.32 Thus, the mere fact that particular governmental action would not violate the Establishment
Clause does not give a religious organization or speaker an automatic entitlement to government largesse. For instance, after Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,33 localities can provide school vouchers for
use at sectarian schools without necessarily running afoul of the
Establishment Clause. This does not create a corollary right to demand that the government create a voucher scheme (at least not
based upon the Free Exercise Clause). Instead, the nondiscrimination principle applies only once the government has affirmatively
acted. Governmental inaction, even when it hinders the exercise of
religion, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
32

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The
fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious
scruples does not, of course, mean that I can demand of government a sum of money,
the better to exercise them. For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what
the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can
exact from the government.”); see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
33
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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Second, one might object that reading a nondiscrimination principle into the Free Exercise Clause, based on Rosenberger, blurs an
important distinction between the Free Speech Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. Traditionally, the Free Speech Clause has
more independent clout than does the Free Exercise Clause. For
instance, questions of “chilling effects” and “overbreadth” are
commonplace in Free Speech jurisprudence,34 such that even potential infringements of Free Speech rights are constitutionally
problematic. These doctrines typically have no place in Free Exercise cases, though.35
Any differences between the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses are arguably much less consequential in light of the concession that the nondiscrimination principle is not unqualified.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has indeed protected speech
more than the free exercise of religion when evaluating a generally
applicable law;36 however, the Free Exercise Clause, in at least
some contexts, affords equally strong protection against facially
discriminatory laws.37 Applying the logic of Free Speech cases in
the Free Exercise context is certainly a major obstacle that any
proponent of a broad nondiscrimination principle must overcome.
But the argument is at least plausible and merits serious consideration.

34
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 243, 255 (2002); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987); Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 458 (1987).
35
See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441–42 (holding that a law permitting timber harvesting and road construction in an area of a national forest used by Native Americans for
religious purposes did not violate the Free Exercise Clause). Although the asserted
claim seemed more like a disparate impact claim, the respondents essentially asserted
a chilling effect on their ability to practice a religion that was otherwise protected by
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 447. Thus, generally applicable laws are subject to less
stringent constitutional scrutiny in the Free Exercise context than in the Free Speech
context.
36
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The only decisions in
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . . .”).
37
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)
(holding that in the Free Exercise context “the minimum requirement of neutrality is
that a law not discriminate on its face”).
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C. Early Indications of a Broad Nondiscrimination Principle
In two cases predating Rosenberger, the Supreme Court appeared to indulge the notion that the Free Exercise Clause contains a strong and broad principle of nondiscrimination. In both instances, though, the Court quickly disavowed the broad
implications of its earlier holdings and effectively cabined them.
Widmar v. Vincent marked the first time that the Supreme Court
announced a broad nondiscrimination principle.38 In Widmar, the
Court held that when the University of Missouri at Kansas City
made its facilities generally available to student groups, the University had created a public forum and, therefore, could not exclude religious groups absent a compelling state interest.39 Although the Court found that avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation was a compelling state interest, it held that allowing
“equal access” to a public forum would not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.40 The question then became whether Missouri
could pursue a more rigorous separation of church and state. Justice Powell, on behalf of the majority, observed that “the state interest asserted here—in achieving greater separation of church and
State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause
and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well.”41
Based on Justice Powell’s observation, the Court appeared to articulate a broad nondiscrimination principle with respect to religion fourteen years before Rosenberger. In fact, Widmar more explicitly included the Free Exercise Clause within the ambit of the
nondiscrimination principle. But Widmar, unlike Rosenberger, did
not lead to wide speculation that the nondiscrimination principle
would apply outside of the public forum context. As it turned out,
Widmar did not have legs.
Two principal reasons explain why Widmar did not capture the
academic imagination the way Rosenberger did. First, despite the
sweeping language, Justice Powell made clear that the holding was
limited to the facts of the case and that the Court was not address38

454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Id. at 267–70.
40
Id. at 271.
41
Id. at 276.
39
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ing the Supremacy Clause question.42 Missouri’s asserted interest in
ensuring a more rigorous separation of church and state could obviously be trumped by the Federal Constitution. Specifically, the
supremacy of the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses might
have limited Missouri’s ability to enact certain nonestablishment
provisions, but the Court in Widmar, while acknowledging the
question, declined to resolve it. Second, the Court had not yet decided cases like Mueller,43 Witters,44 and Zobrest,45 which began to
relax the Establishment Clause’s no-aid principle. Even in light of
those cases, the history and circumstances of Witters, recounted in
Part II, implied that the government still had wide discretion in
preventing state funds from flowing to religious organizations.46 In
short, the constitutional ethos of the day indicated that the Court
did not take seriously the notion that a broad nondiscrimination
principle would apply outside of the public forum context.
The second case in which the Court appeared to articulate a
broad nondiscrimination principle was Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.47 At issue was a local ordinance banning
animal sacrifice, a central tenet of the Santeria religion, which the
city council passed when a Santeria congregation announced plans
to build a church in the city. The Court, through Justice Kennedy,
declared that the state may never “target[] religious beliefs as
such” and must behave neutrally with respect to religion.48 In determining whether the government has singled out religion for disfavored treatment, the Court noted that “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.”49
Lukumi included an explicit articulation of a broad nondiscrimination principle, but the Court yet again retreated from the farreaching implications of the opinion’s language. Writing for the
Court in Davey, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited Lukumi by holding that it stands only for the proposition that the state may not ex-

42

Id. at 275–76.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
45
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
46
See infra notes 118–32 and accompanying text.
47
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
48
Id. at 533.
49
Id.
43
44
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press animus toward religion.50 Having recast the Free Exercise inquiry as one that turned solely on animus, the Davey Court found
that Washington’s constitutional provision, though more restrictive
than the federal Establishment Clause, did not evince such hostility. Instead, Washington merely sought to ensure a reasonable
separation of church and state consistent with the practice of most
states during the Founding period.51
Despite Lukumi’s broad language indicating that neutrality requires facial nondiscrimination, the context in which the case arose
was significantly different than any of the equal access cases. Lukumi involved a state regulation of religion itself, rather than a denial of benefits. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, “[t]he
crucial word in the constitutional text is ‘prohibit,’”52 and the city of
Hialeah had effectively sought to prohibit the Santeria religion. As
Professor Laycock has argued, regulation and funding cases are
conceptually different. Although the state, in its regulatory capacity, may not single out religion for less than even-handed treatment, Davey stands for the idea that the state, when providing
funding to religious and secular organizations, does not have to behave with the same even-handedness.53 Thus, Davey effectively
confined the broad nondiscrimination principle that the Court
seemed to have announced in Lukumi.
D. Emerging Support for Rosenberger’s Broad
Nondiscrimination Principle
Unlike other cases that appeared to announce a broad nondiscrimination principle with respect to the Free Exercise Clause,
Rosenberger was uniquely poised to effectuate what earlier cases
could not. Widmar had little effect outside the public forum context after Witters, and Lukumi pertained only to regulation rather
than funding. Rosenberger was different for several reasons. Most
importantly, even though the Court styled it as a public forum case,
Rosenberger was just as much a funding case. In Widmar and other
equal access cases, the Court had emphasized that allowing reli50

Davey, 540 U.S. at 720, 724–25.
Id. at 723–25.
52
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
53
Laycock, supra note 13, at 216–17 (2004).
51

TRAMMELL_BOOK

2006]

11/15/2006 7:19 PM

The Cabining of Rosenberger

1973

gious groups to use public facilities on the same terms as other organizations, unlike providing funds to religious organizations, did
not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Any benefits to
religion were merely “incidental.”54 Several scholars have criticized
this distinction as a fiction: providing direct monetary aid to religion is no different than allowing religious groups to avail themselves of valuable space; the difference in aid is a matter of degree,
not kind.55 Even if the critics’ contentions are correct, the Court has
continued to indulge the idea that the difference between access
and funding cases matters. To the extent that Rosenberger was indeed a funding case, it effectuated a profound change in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Furthermore, Rosenberger contained none of the limiting language that Widmar did.56
In the immediate aftermath of Rosenberger, some commentators
intimated that Rosenberger embodied a broad nondiscrimination
principle. Several scholars, two of whom are now federal appellate
court judges, queried whether Rosenberger’s prohibitions against
viewpoint discrimination would be far-reaching, possibly extending
beyond public fora to tuition-assistance programs.57 Professor
Paulsen, in addition to distilling a broad nondiscrimination principle from Rosenberger, explicitly argued that the public forum
analysis should apply to funding cases.58 Although the arguments
advanced by these scholars rested solely on the analogy between
funding situations and the limited public forum created by the
University in Rosenberger, there was still one missing piece to the
puzzle as far as most scholars were concerned—whether the Estab54

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1981).
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell et al., Religion and the Constitution 767–77
(2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 859
n.211 (1993).
56
See Widmar, 454 U.S. 275–76.
57
See, e.g., McConnell et al., supra note 55, at 530 (“After Rosenberger, is the state
not only permitted but also constitutionally required to give Larry Witters vocational
assistance like other students?”); Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and
Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 Nev. L.J. 551, 580–81 (2002).
58
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited
Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 711–12 (1996) (arguing that Rosenberger
provides the logical foundation for applying limited public forum analysis and giving
religious groups equal access to generally available financial benefits).
55
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lishment Clause permitted extension of the public forum logic in
this way. Not until Zelman v. Simmons-Harris59 did the issue
squarely present itself.
When the Court decided Rosenberger, the no-aid principle was a
hallmark of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such that government programs directly benefiting religion were presumptively
unconstitutional.60 The Court’s equal access rulings like Widmar,
which entitled religious groups to take advantage of limited public
fora, were the exception to the rule. In light of a strong no-aid
principle, state constitutional provisions that barred any financial
aid to religious organizations—such as the Missouri provision at issue in Widmar and the Washington provision that led to the Davey
litigation—perfectly tracked the federal Establishment Clause.61
Thus, the potential conflict between state nonestablishment provisions and the Free Exercise Clause was not immediately apparent
when the Court decided Rosenberger.
This changed with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.62 Zelman dealt
with a voucher scheme in Cleveland, Ohio, that granted parents a
tuition credit if their children attended a private school, including
59

536 U.S. 639 (2002).
The genesis of the no-aid approach was Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971) (describing the “three main evils” that the Establishment Clause forbids as
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))). In the decade before Rosenberger, the Court had begun to retreat from a strict application of the noaid principle, emphasizing instead the concept of neutrality toward religion; however,
a majority of the Court still believed that direct aid to religious organizations was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (controlling opinion) (“[W]e decided Witters [v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986),] and Zobrest [v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993),] on the understanding that the aid was
provided directly to the individual student who, in turn, made the choice of where to
put that aid to use.”).
61
See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1859 (2004).
62
Some might argue that the real change occurred earlier when the Supreme Court
abandoned the principle that direct aid to religion was forbidden. See Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 816; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997). Although the earlier cases
were clearly important, one could still properly describe the benefits at issue in those
cases as “incidental” to the schools’ primary curriculum. While the distinction between funding incidental programs versus a school’s primary curriculum might be one
of degree, rather than kind, the difference still seemed important. For an argument
that Zelman represented the true jurisprudential shift, see Schragger, supra note 61, at
1859.
60
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religious institutions, in lieu of public schools. Although the
voucher system resulted in some public funds eventually being directed toward religious institutions, the Supreme Court found that
the system did not violate the Establishment Clause for two principal reasons: first, the scheme made educational funds available on
a neutral basis, irrespective of whether parents chose a secular or
sectarian school; second, parents, rather than the state, chose how
to spend the tuition credits.63 The operative phrase became “true
private choice,” which cured any Establishment Clause concerns.64
The interaction of Rosenberger and Zelman teed up the question
that Davey addressed: if preventing an Establishment Clause violation is a compelling state interest (a point on which the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed in Rosenberger), but the Establishment Clause no longer requires that religious groups be
excluded from neutrally available funding schemes, may states continue to enforce their more stringent nonestablishment provisions?65 In light of the interaction of Rosenberger and Zelman,
many commentators began to postulate that Rosenberger would
take on new significance.66 The Establishment Clause was no longer
an impediment to the broad nondiscrimination principle announced by Rosenberger.
After Zelman, the relevant constitutional inquiry became
whether viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally problematic
outside of the public forum context. Some commentators have improperly focused on whether differentiation based on religion,
even in the context of funding schemes, constitutes viewpoint discrimination.67 After Rosenberger, it almost certainly does. Instead,
the real focus should be on whether viewpoint discrimination is
problematic only in public fora or in other contexts as well. As Part
III discusses in greater length, the Court has given two conflicting
63

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661–63.
Id. at 663.
65
See Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 189 (2003).
66
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 18; Joshua
Edelstein, Note, Zelman, Davey, and the Case for Mandatory Government Funding
for Religious Education, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 151, 177–78 (2004).
67
See F. Philip Manns, Jr., Finding the “Free Play” Between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 657, 681 (2004); Edelstein, supra note 66, at
175.
64
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answers to this question. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,68 decided after Rosenberger, the Court held that viewpoint discrimination was not permissible, even when an actual forum was not at issue. Ten years earlier in Rust v. Sullivan,69 a case predating
Rosenberger, the Court reached the opposite conclusion—in the
funding context, the allocation of money for certain activities, to
the exclusion of others, is constitutionally unproblematic.70 Few
scholars acknowledge this doctrinal tension when arguing for or
against the applicability of Rosenberger in the funding context.71
Since Rosenberger, and especially since Zelman, several scholars
have endorsed the idea that Rosenberger announced a broad nondiscrimination principle. According to this perspective, viewpoint
discrimination is anathema in the funding context just as it is with
public fora. Although earlier cases had appeared to announce a
broad principle of nondiscrimination against religion, Rosenberger
was unique because it involved a funding scheme. Consequently,
the requirement of viewpoint neutrality that had always characterized the public forum analysis might logically extend to any governmental action, including the decision to create funding programs. If the government must always behave in a viewpointneutral fashion, then a broad nondiscrimination principle would
exist. The arguments in favor of such a principle gained new steam
once Zelman made clear that providing funds to religious organizations does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. As a
matter of logic and jurisprudence, these arguments are certainly
plausible and provide the necessary grounding for a broad nondiscrimination principle. The following sections consider whether
these arguments can withstand several important criticisms.

68

531 U.S. 533 (2001).
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
70
Admittedly, the Court in Rust found that the decision to fund certain programs to
the exclusion of others did not actually constitute viewpoint discrimination. Id. at
194–95. The point may be somewhat academic, but it seems clear that when the government chooses to support certain ideas to the exclusion of others, it has chosen one
viewpoint over another. Thus, the better way to understand Rust is not that the government did not engage in viewpoint discrimination, but rather that privileging certain viewpoints is unproblematic in the funding context.
71
But see Berg, supra note 65, at 179–86. Professor Berg candidly admits the tension, but would find that voucher schemes are more analogous to the SAF in Rosenberger than to the funding at issue in Rust. Id. at 186.
69
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E. Responses to Critics of a Broad Nondiscrimination Principle
Opposition to the extension of the public forum analysis to funding cases can take many forms. Some opponents draw on inconsequential distinctions between funding schemes and the activities
fund at issue in Rosenberger;72 however, several critics have addressed potentially substantial differences between public fora and
funding schemes, particularly vouchers.73 In Davey, the Court relied on the fact that public fora are designed to promote a diversity
of viewpoints. Only under such specialized circumstances does the
command of viewpoint neutrality obtain.74 Before Davey, some
scholars anticipated this distinction, arguing that the context of a
public forum is so unique as to render its rules inapplicable in other
situations. Instead of simply dismissing Rosenberger and other public forum cases as inapposite to Free Exercise cases, as the Court
did in Davey, Professors Lupu and Tuttle have parsed principled
distinctions between public fora and other contexts. “Ordinarily . . .
the provision of public services—even if they have an expressive
component—is conceptually distinct from the creation of a forum

72
For instance, some commentators focus on the distinction between direct aid
(paying money to a religious organization) and indirect aid (paying money to third
parties who then direct the funds to a religious organization, as was the case in
Rosenberger and Zelman). See Rita-Anne O’Neill, Note, The School Voucher Debate
After Zelman: Can States Be Compelled to Fund Sectarian Schools Under the Federal Constitution?, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1397, 1399 (2003) (viewing the direct-indirect distinction as significant). As a formalistic matter, the distinction might function as a
constitutional decision rule; however, the real constitutional question is whether individuals have directed the funds through private choice, and not the precise number of
hands through which the money passes. On a related note, some might point to the
language in Rosenberger distinguishing the SAF, to which only University students
contributed, from a general tax assessment. Again, for constitutional purposes, the
distinction should be irrelevant, because regardless of who contributes to the funding
scheme, a state institution would still choose whether to make the funds available to
religious groups. See Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and
Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 568 n.320 (2003) (arguing that the
Court’s distinction is unpersuasive).
73
In an analysis of whether the logic of Rosenberger and Zelman would require that
religious schools be allowed to participate in voucher programs, Professor Tushnet
discusses three possible reasons why Rosenberger might not be applicable in the funding context. Interestingly, none of the three rests on the proposition that Rosenberger
is only a public forum case. Tushnet, supra note 66, at 19–21.
74
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3.
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for debate.”75 That is, only in the narrow circumstance in which
government promotes a diversity of viewpoints for the inherent
value thereof do the stringent rules of the public forum apply.
When the government seeks to accomplish any other goal, it necessarily must choose between competing alternatives. According to
this view, the existence of a public forum is a rare instance when
the government must fund something.
Despite the analytical elegance of differentiating public fora
from almost everything else the government chooses to fund, three
responses seem plausible. First, and most importantly, Rosenberger
is a funding case. Courts have frequently observed that Rosenberger is a public forum case and thereby implied that it is not applicable to funding cases.76 This is a false dichotomy because Rosenberger is both a public forum case and a funding case.77 Some might
object to this characterization of Rosenberger since the University
did not pay funds directly to a religious organization.78 Funding
cases, however, rarely entail such direct payment of public resources to support the workings of a religious organization. Instead, they most often involve the provision of general resources
that greatly benefit such an organization.79 For instance, in Board
of Education v. Allen,80 when New York provided secular textbooks to religious schools, it did not pay funds directly to a sectarian institution, nor did it directly support the schools’ core religious
teachings. Nonetheless, one can hardly doubt that Allen is a funding case. Similarly, in her Rosenberger concurrence, Justice

75
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers,
and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917, 980
(2003). Comparing voucher programs and true public fora, Professors Lupu and Tuttle note that “a voucher program may exclude schools that teach that the Earth is flat,
even though a public forum on the shape of the planet may not exclude such a view.”
Id. at 981.
76
See infra notes 186–89, 210–13 and accompanying text.
77
See Duncan, supra note 72, at 569 (arguing that “Rosenberger logically applied to
a discriminatory funding scheme the principles of religious non-persecution found in
the earlier religious speech cases”).
78
The payments were indirect, and even though WAP was engaged in a “religious
activity,” it was not actually a “religious organization.” See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
79
See Laycock, supra note 13, at 163.
80
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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O’Connor conceded that funding of a religious activity, albeit indirectly, was at issue.81
Perhaps one could argue that Rosenberger’s status as a public forum case subsumes any trappings it may have of a funding case.
The main problem with this approach is that it seeks to convert a
disbursement of funds into a public forum and thereby ignore the
fact that any money has inured to the benefit of a religious organization. Before Rosenberger, the Court had long drawn a distinction
between public fora involving space and funding schemes involving
money.82 Although some scholars have argued that allowing religious groups to use public space is not constitutionally distinct
from inviting them to partake of a neutral funding scheme,83 the
difference is more than one of degree. Intuitively, the benefit to a
religious organization that avails itself of a physical public forum is
de minimis, whereas a monetary contribution attains a greater level
of significance.
There is also a meaningful doctrinal difference between public
fora and funding schemes. If the government permits unfettered
speech in a park, it cannot, for example, allow speech by those who
think that the Vietnam War was justified and prohibit speech by
those who think it was unjustified. By contrast, if the government
builds a memorial to Vietnam War veterans, hardly anyone would
argue that the government has a concomitant obligation to build a
memorial to the war’s protesters. Both scenarios—and their commonsense outcomes—correspond to the idea that a meaningful difference exists between places and funding schemes. In public
places, where people traditionally congregate and engage in dialogue, viewpoint discrimination is especially odious. But when government spends public money, it necessarily makes policy choices
that not everyone will embrace. The state must have wide discretion to prefer certain viewpoints when spending public funds. By
holding that money could constitute a public forum, the Court in
Rosenberger blurred the distinction between equal access cases and
81

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
For an interesting argument that the Court subtly announced a new definition of
neutrality with respect to religion by extending the nondiscrimination principle to
funding cases, see Jason S. Marks, Only a “Speed Bump” Separating Church and
State?, 57 J. Mo. B. 36, 41 (2001).
83
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
82
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funding cases, vastly expanding the reach of the nondiscrimination
principle beyond the forum context.
The second response to arguments against a broad nondiscrimination principle is that, as Professor Laycock has argued, the
Court’s analysis in Rust v. Sullivan is inapplicable to a funding case
in which religion is the basis for differential treatment. For anyone
who would find a broad nondiscrimination principle in Rosenberger, Rust is one of the most problematic cases. At issue was
whether the government could prevent family planning facilities
that received government funding from discussing abortion with
patients. The Supreme Court upheld the restriction. Rust essentially stands for the proposition that even though a constitutional
right might exist, such as the right to have an abortion, the government does not have to fund the exercise of that right and may
even express disapproval of it. Thus, the government may engage
in selective funding that intentionally discourages the exercise of
the right to have an abortion. Even if Rust states a general proposition to this effect, religion arguably is an exception because of the
constitutional imperative that government remain neutral toward
religion. Although the Free Exercise Clause may not create an absolute entitlement to governmental support for religious activity,
the First Amendment requires that the government affirmatively
avoid any expression of disapproval. While the government may
engage in selective funding to discourage abortions, such discretion
is arguably limited with respect to religion.84
If the government can persuasively argue that exclusion of religion from a generally available funding scheme is motivated by a
strong interest in separationism, rather than animus, perhaps there
has been no expression of disapproval. Even in light of this
counterargument, though, Professor Laycock seems correct in suggesting that abortion and religion present conceptually different
cases. While government may officially disapprove of abortion and
84

Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 235–36; Laycock, supra note 13, at 176–78. This
argument has intuitive appeal and may well represent a persuasive case for Rust’s inapplicability when funds are available to religious organizations; however, there is
something question-begging about it. Although the Religion Clauses do prohibit governmental disapproval of religion, defining the concept of disapproval is important.
Davey, for instance, is cagey about whether the disqualification of devotional theology majors from the Promise Scholarship program constitutes official disapproval.
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
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refuse to fund it, even the taint of governmental disapproval regarding religion is probably impermissible.
The third response to opponents of a nondiscrimination principle is that the goals of the public forum doctrine and the Religion
Clauses are often salutary. Importing public forum analysis into
funding cases involving religion might thus be legitimate and doctrinally justifiable. Professor BeVier has argued that the categories
comprising the modern public forum analysis roughly correspond
to notions of when government regulation of speech is most suspect.85 According to this theory, the public forum doctrine is best
understood as reflecting a distortion model, according to which the
principal concern of the Free Speech Clause is preventing the government from manipulating public debate. The public forum categories identify those situations in which a skewing of public discourse is most likely and restrains governmental discretion
accordingly.86 In the Religion Clauses context, Professor Laycock
has identified a similar anti-skewing principle, which he terms
“substantive neutrality.”87 According to this view, the constitutional
test for whether the government has behaved neutrally with respect to religion turns on whether the government has substantively altered the incentives for someone to engage in or abstain
from religious exercise.88
Read together, the theories advanced by Professor BeVier and
Professor Laycock indicate that the First Amendment embodies an
anti-skewing principle. This is not to claim that the various doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence are interchangeable
85

BeVier, supra note 10, at 121.
Id. at 102–05. For instance, regulations of traditional public fora, such as streets
and parks, receive the most scrutiny in part because the government has an absolute
monopoly over them. Id. at 107.
87
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1001 (1990).
88
Id. at 1001–03. For example, in determining whether a prohibition on the consumption of alcohol must except the use of sacramental wine, the relevant inquiry is
whether granting or refusing to grant an exemption skews religious incentives. Arguably an exemption does not encourage more religious participation. “It is conceivable that the prospect of a tiny nip would encourage some desperate folks to join a
church that uses real wine . . . . but only to a law professor or an economist.” Id. at
1003. By contrast, failing to grant an exemption for religious uses of wine would severely discourage religious exercise. Id. Admittedly, Professor Laycock’s view, though
eminently reasonable, has not attracted universal acceptance. See id. at 994–95.
86
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parts. But to the extent that a Free Speech doctrine can help effectuate the goals of the Religion Clauses, such doctrinal fluidity
could be beneficial. Especially in light of the Court’s recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which tends to emphasize neutrality
over the no-aid principle, the logic of the public forum doctrine fits
cleanly into the modern controversy surrounding the funding cases.
The newly relaxed Establishment Clause permits religious organizations to take advantage of certain government funds. Now that
governments have the option of including religious organizations in
funding schemes, a decision either way—to fund or not to fund—
reflects an actual choice by the government; it is no longer a result
preordained by the Establishment Clause. The government, endowed with new funding discretion, now has the ability to skew individuals’ religious options.89 If an anti-skewing principle is indeed
a hallmark of the Religion Clauses, the principles of the public forum doctrine can alleviate the potential for skewing. This might
suggest that despite the government’s general latitude over funding
decisions, those decisions must be viewpoint neutral with respect to
religion. Unlike the intractable problem of defining what counts as
“disapproval” of religion, the skewing analysis is arguably more
objective. In determining whether the government should include
religion in a funding scheme, the salient question becomes whether
inclusion or exclusion would substantively alter someone’s incentive to engage in religious exercise.
Although there are principled reasons for believing that public
fora are unique, those reasons do not necessarily refute arguments
in favor of finding a broad nondiscrimination principle in Rosenberger. As discussed above, there are three main arguments for believing that a nondiscrimination principle is still plausible. First,
and most importantly, Rosenberger was both a funding case and a
public forum case, indicating the Supreme Court’s willingness to
extend forum logic to funding schemes. Second, differentiation
based on religion is inherently suspect, such that a nondiscrimination principle remains viable notwithstanding Rust. Finally, extending the public forum doctrine to funding schemes, thereby creating
89

One might argue that under the categorical no-aid principle, religious options
were always skewed. Even if this is true, the skewing resulted from constitutional
compulsion. Skewing is arguably less tolerable when the government has the latitude
to make an actual choice.
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a broad nondiscrimination principle, serves to prevent skewing of
religious options. Arguments opposing a broad nondiscrimination
principle are thus far from conclusive.90
F. Grounding a Nondiscrimination Principle in the Equal
Protection Clause
Given the Supreme Court’s current Free Exercise jurisprudence,
some judges have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause
might offer a more effective way to challenge facial discrimination
against religion. Recent cases have emphasized that “prohibit” is
the operative word in the Free Exercise Clause, such that exclusion
of religious organizations from funding programs might not offend
the First Amendment,91 a proposition that Davey supported.92 Al90

Some scholars have made two other arguments in favor of a nondiscrimination
principle, but these arguments are less convincing and do not usefully advance the
debate. The first argument is that funding schemes, such as vouchers or scholarships,
are not simply analogous to public fora but actually are fora for speech. According to
this argument, schools teach from different viewpoints; voucher programs and
scholarships seek to encourage such diversity; hence, vouchers are fora for speech.
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 65, at 179. The supposed syllogism fails because the relevant question is whether the vouchers or scholarships, not the schools as such, function as fora for expression. When the government adopts a funding scheme enabling
students to attend the private school of their choice, the government promotes education, not the exchange of ideas. To be sure, education involves the dissemination of
ideas from specific viewpoints, but the various schools that participate in a voucher
program are not in dialogue among themselves about the viewpoints that they promote.
The second line of inquiry that seems unfruitful concerns the dichotomy that scholars and courts sometimes draw by asking who is speaking—the government or a private individual? See infra notes 152–58 and accompanying text; see also Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 233; Duncan, supra note 72, at 585; Michael Kavey, Note,
Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right To Discriminate, 113 Yale
L.J. 743, 757 (2003). The dichotomy is often false, though, because funding schemes
frequently have nothing to do with communicating a message or, at most, have only
an incidental effect on speech. When the government funds a particular activity, the
government might be unconcerned with any speech attendant to the activity. For instance, if the government provides financial support on a neutral basis to soup kitchens, it seems highly unlikely that the government is interested in any particular message. The purpose of the program is to feed the indigent. It would be quixotic and
nonsensical to ask who is speaking and what the message is.
91
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
92
See Davey, 540 U.S. at 720; see also Eulitt v. Me., Dep’t of Educ. 386 F.3d 344, 354
(1st Cir. 2004). Some scholars have objected to the Court’s conclusion that the word
“prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause is narrower than the phrases pertaining to
other First Amendment freedoms, arguing that the Court’s interpretation is incorrect
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though Davey found that the Equal Protection claim essentially
piggy-backed on the Free Exercise argument,93 this conclusion is
premature.
Even in light of “play in the joints” between what the Establishment Clause forbids and what the Free Exercise Clause requires,
the Equal Protection Clause may require that funding schemes not
facially discriminate against religion. The Court in Davey said that
without a Free Exercise right, the plaintiff had no fundamental
right to even-handed treatment of religion in the context of a funding scheme. In the absence of a fundamental right, a law that is not
facially neutral with respect to religion need survive only rational
basis scrutiny. Davey found that Washington’s asserted interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and state could withstand
such scrutiny.94 Despite the lack of a fundamental right based on
the Free Exercise Clause, other courts have given more credence
to an Equal Protection challenge based on facially disparate treatment of religion. For instance, a Maine voucher program prohibited parents from using state funds to send their children to private
sectarian schools. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine and the
First Circuit upheld the facial differentiation based on religion,
opining that the Establishment Clause required such a result.95
(Both cases preceded Zelman, the Supreme Court decision holding
that the Establishment Clause does not necessarily prohibit
voucher programs involving sectarian schools.) The Maine court
observed, however, that the Equal Protection Clause would be an
impediment to the disparate treatment of religion unless the Establishment Clause required such differentiation.96 In a concurrence,
as a matter of original intent. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1486–88
(1990).
93
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3.
94
Id. at 720–22.
95
Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t,
728 A.2d 127, 147 (Me. 1999).
96
Bagley, 728 A.2d at 138 (conversely noting that “[i]f the exclusion is required in
order to comply with the Establishment Clause, the State will have presented a compelling justification for the disparate treatment of religious schools, and the parents’
Equal Protection claim will fail”); see also id. at 150 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination based on religion in a program providing . . . [tuition] aid unless the discrimination is absolutely necessary to
avoid Establishment Clause violations”).
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Judge Campbell of the First Circuit endorsed the Maine court’s
dictum.97
Supposing that a plaintiff cannot establish a Free Exercise right
to avail himself of a funding scheme, he might be able to argue that
facially disparate treatment of religion cannot satisfy even rational
basis scrutiny absent an actual Establishment Clause violation.
Such an approach would essentially impute animus to a state that
singles out religion for differential treatment. Davey refused to impute animus to the State of Washington; however, the argument
still seems plausible, principally because it simply shifts the burden
of proof to the defendant to justify why a funding scheme should
not treat religion evenhandedly. Although the argument might be
difficult after Davey, it is at least colorable.
II. “PLAY IN THE JOINTS” CASES
Part I examined the first line of precedent—the public forum
cases—and focused specifically on Rosenberger. Based on the text
of the opinion and the fact that Rosenberger was a funding case,
Part I posited that the Court arguably announced a broad nondiscrimination principle with respect to religion. Such a conclusion,
however, does not exist in isolation. This Part begins the process of
triangulating the three competing lines of cases by turning to the
second set of precedent, the “play in the joints” cases. It starts with
a brief consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Locke v.
Davey,98 the first Religion Clauses case to endorse the maxim of
“play in the joints” in an actual holding. Although the Court in
Davey claimed that “play in the joints” had long existed as a fixture
of church and state jurisprudence, the Court’s assertion is somewhat hasty. After examining the precedents in support of a “play in
the joints” theory, this Part concludes that, even though the evidence is far from dispositive, “play in the joints” had existed as a
constitutional doctrine before Davey and that Davey faithfully applied that doctrine. While the notion of “play in the joints” has
generated little analysis in the wake of Davey, it will probably constitute Davey’s most enduring legacy.

97
98

Strout, 178 F.3d at 66 n.13 (Campbell, J., concurring).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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A. Locke v. Davey
In 1999, the State of Washington created a Promise Scholarship
Program that entitled all Washington students meeting certain requirements to a scholarship in excess of $1000 for college education.99 Any student receiving the award was bound by only two
conditions: he or she (1) had to be enrolled at least half-time and
(2) was not permitted to study devotional theology.100 Joshua
Davey, a student of devotional theology at Northwest College, alleged that the law facially discriminated against religion and, therefore, was unconstitutional. Washington argued in defense that its
constitution required an even more rigorous separation of church
and state than did the federal Constitution.101
Until recently, the exclusion of theology majors from the Promise Scholarship program would have seemed unproblematic to
most jurists, because relevant Supreme Court precedents indicated
that the federal Establishment Clause required such an exclusion.102
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,103
though, cast the question in an entirely new light. Zelman was the
Cleveland voucher case in which the Court held that a voucher
scheme allowing parents to send their children to sectarian schools
did not violate the Establishment Clause.104 With Zelman, the
99
Students had to graduate in the top 15% of their high school classes, score at least
1200 on the SAT or 27 on the ACT, and have a family income of less than 135% of
the state’s median income. The scholarship carried a value of $1,125 for the 1999–2000
academic year and $1,542 for the 2000–01 academic year. Id. at 715–16.
100
Id. at 716.
101
Id. at 719 n.2 (“No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied
to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” (quoting Wash. Const. art. I, § 11)).
102
Some might take issue with this assertion. In Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), the Court held that the Establishment Clause permitted a recipient of state scholarship funding to attend a private religious vocational
school of his choosing. Similarly, the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1 (1993), upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge the provision of
a sign-language interpreter to a deaf child attending a religious school. But both cases
are notable for their emphasis on the fact that in neither situation would the state be
directly funding religious education as such. By contrast, general voucher schemes
seem qualitatively different and thus more problematic under the Establishment
Clause because state funds would arguably support the inherently religious aspects of
a sectarian school’s curriculum.
103
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
104
See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
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Court seemed to invite the question that it confronted two years
later in Davey: if the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the
inclusion of religious schools in voucher or scholarship schemes,
does the Free Exercise Clause require that such programs be neutral with respect to religion? Davey responded in the negative. The
Supreme Court issued a short opinion that focused on whether
Washington could enforce a more stringent nonestablishment principle than the Establishment Clause required.
The lynchpin of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis in Davey was
his invocation of “play in the joints,” the logic of which the Chief
Justice succinctly expressed:
[T]he Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause[] are
frequently in tension. Yet we have long said that “there is room
for play in the joints” between them. In other words, there are
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but
105
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.

Aside from the doctrinal holding, which ultimately proved dispositive of the case, there are two notable elements to this quotation. First, the majority treated as given that the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause are in tension. If, as Supreme
Court precedent often indicates, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from “aiding” religion and the Free Exercise
Clause requires that religion be treated evenhandedly, there is indeed a tension. Davey is the quintessential situation in which the
conflict arises. Some jurists and scholars have taken issue with this
characterization, though, typically arguing that the Supreme Court
has created the insuperable tension by unduly expanding the reach
of the Establishment Clause.106 To the extent that the Chief Justice
105

Davey, 540 U.S. at 718–19 (citations omitted).
Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 245–46 (“The Religion Clauses should be read
as complementary aspects of a single principle. To interpret them as conflicting is, as
one of us has previously argued, ‘a mistake at the most fundamental level.’”); see also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (observing that “there are many situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the Court’s insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause”); id. at 416 (arguing that “it is the Court’s duty
to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause of
the Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court”) (emphasis added); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123,
150–53.
106
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acknowledged an inherent tension, he signaled that Davey was not
intended to be a departure from existing precedent. Second, and
more importantly, the Chief Justice implied that the Court had
long embraced “play in the joints” as an integral part of the Religion Clauses. This implication, though, is an overstatement, as discussed in the following Section. The remainder of this Part explores the extent to which the theory of “play in the joints” was
part of the Court’s jurisprudence and whether Davey faithfully
employed the concept.
B. Origins of “Play in the Joints”
The phrase “play in the joints” comes from a 1970 case, Walz v.
Tax Commission, in which the concept at least partially animated
the Court’s decision.107 Although several Supreme Court opinions
have alluded to this idea since 1963, “play in the joints” hardly enjoyed the status of settled doctrine. This Section traces the evolution of the theory, which clearly inspired the thinking of several
Justices over the years but never figured into an actual holding by
the Supreme Court until Davey.
1. Sherbert
Chief Justice Burger coined the phrase “play in the joints” in
Walz, but, as he readily acknowledged, the concept traces back at
least to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Sherbert v. Verner.108 At issue in
Sherbert was whether South Carolina could deny unemployment
benefits to a woman who declined to accept employment that
would require her to work on Saturday, the day she observed as
the Sabbath. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required that South Carolina’s unemployment law include an exemption for Saturday Sabbatarians.109 Justice Harlan wrote a dissent,
the tenor of which is instructive. A dissent could have taken several
tacks. First, it might have noted that the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence forbade any overt accommodation of religion, such that exceptions for Saturday Sabbatarians would violate

107

397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
109
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409–10.
108
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the no-aid principle.110 Second, it might have argued that neutral
laws by definition cannot violate the Free Exercise Clause because
laws that are generally applicable, even if they burden religious exercise, pass constitutional muster. This approach is similar to the
Court’s current Free Exercise jurisprudence.111 Justice Harlan,
though, preferred a third alternative, a middle ground between the
majority opinion that categorically required South Carolina to create an exception and those who argued that South Carolina was
forbidden to make any accommodations based on religion. Justice
Harlan explained his position as follows:
[I]t would be a permissible accommodation of religion for the
State, if it chose to do so, to create an exception to its eligibility
requirements for persons like [Mrs. Sherbert]. The constitutional
obligation of “neutrality” is not so narrow a channel that the
slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to
112
condemnation.

Thus, according to Justice Harlan, the Free Exercise Clause did not
command South Carolina to create an exception, but neither did
the Establishment Clause forbid it.
2. Walz
Although Justice Harlan had dissented in Sherbert, the Court
endorsed his approach in Walz. At issue in Walz was a New York
property tax exemption that applied to “real or personal property
used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes.”113 A New York resident challenged the exemption as a violation of the Establishment Clause.114 Writing for eight Justices,
Chief Justice Burger placed great emphasis on the notion that the
Free Exercise Clause does not necessarily require that which the
Establishment Clause does not forbid. After quoting from Justice

110

Justice Stewart made this point in his separate opinion in Sherbert. Id. at 413–17
(Stewart, J., concurring in result).
111
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990); Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451–52 (1988).
112
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
113
Walz, 397 U.S. at 666–67.
114
Id.
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Harlan’s dissent in Sherbert, Chief Justice Burger offered his gloss
on the Religion Clauses.
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment . . . is
this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of
those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and with115
out interference.

Similarly, the Chief Justice later observed that “[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means coextensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.”116 One should note that the type of accommodation that
the Chief Justice discussed in Walz was different than the accommodation at issue in Sherbert. In Sherbert, the Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause required the law to include an exemption for
religious observation and nothing else. By contrast, the accommodation at issue in Walz was a benefit that the government had also
made available to other charitable organizations. Perhaps the
Court in Walz was imprecise when referring to the benefit scheme
as an “accommodation” of religion, but the terminology was not
consequential for the Court’s “play in the joints” analysis.
Given the centrality of the “play in the joints” theory in the
Court’s opinion, combined with the nearly unanimous support for
the opinion, the concept arguably acquired doctrinal significance.
The problem, and one of the great mysteries of the opinion, is that
for all of the attention the Chief Justice devoted to crafting a theory of “play in the joints,” his efforts yielded little more than a superfluous, albeit catchy, turn of phrase. Walz was an Establishment
Clause case, not a Free Exercise case. There was no need for the
Court to mediate the competing demands of the two clauses. If a
religious organization had claimed that the Free Exercise Clause
entitled it to a property tax exemption, and a citizen objected
based on the Establishment Clause, the case would squarely have
called for the analysis that Chief Justice Burger undertook. As it

115
116

Id. at 669.
Id. at 673.
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was, though, only the Establishment Clause was at issue.117 Thus,
the broad language with which Chief Justice Burger announced
and developed a theory of “play in the joints” was in dicta, hardly
creating settled doctrine.
3. Witters
The last major case in this line of precedent was Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,118 arguably the most
relevant case for analyzing the issues presented in Davey. By statute, Washington provided financial assistance for blind individuals
to obtain educational and vocational training. When Larry Witters
applied to the Washington Commission for the Blind in order to
attend a private Christian college, the Commission denied the request, relying on Washington’s state constitutional prohibition
against funding “religious instruction.”119 Interestingly, the state
constitutional provision was the same one at issue in Davey.120 The
Court found that inclusion of religious institutions in the assistance
program would not violate the Establishment Clause,121 but it declined to reach the Free Exercise question:
On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of the “far stricter” dictates of the Washington State
Constitution . . . . We decline petitioner’s invitation to leapfrog
consideration of those issues by holding that the Free Exercise
Clause requires Washington to extend vocational rehabilitation
117
See id. at 667 (“The essence of appellant’s contention was that the . . . grant of an
exemption . . . violates provisions prohibiting establishment of religion under the First
Amendment which under the Fourteenth Amendment is binding on the states.”). Justice Brennan’s concurrence focused only on whether the exemption violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 680–94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
119
Id. at 483–84.
120
Wash. Const. art. I, § 11; see Davey, 540 U.S. at 719 n.2; Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 484 (1986).
121
The majority opinion by Justice Marshall emphasized that the state gave financial
aid to students who then could direct the money to the institution of their choosing.
For Justice Marshall, the element of private choice alleviated any Establishment
Clause concerns, such that there was no state action in support of religion. Witters, 474
U.S. at 487–89. Justice Powell’s concurrence underscored that Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983), provided precedential support for the Court’s holding that the program at issue in Witters would not violate the Establishment Clause. Witters, 474 U.S.
at 490–92 (Powell, J., concurring).
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aid to petitioner regardless of what the State Constitution commands or further factual development reveals, and we express no
122
opinion on that matter.

By refusing to answer the Free Exercise question, the Court
seemed to take a minimalist approach.
On remand, the Washington Supreme Court had no trouble concluding that the Washington Constitution created an absolute bar
to aiding religious instruction.123 Furthermore, in finding that the
denial of the benefit did not have a coercive effect on individuals’
private choices, the court concluded that the Washington Constitution did not violate the federal Free Exercise Clause.124 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari on this question.125
As a matter of precedent, the denial of certiorari meant nothing,126 such that the Supreme Court remained agnostic about
whether the Free Exercise Clause should prevent Washington from
enforcing its stricter nonestablishment principle. The history of
Witters, though, is quite instructive. In Part III of the Supreme
Court opinion, Justice Marshall went to great lengths to explain
that the Court’s holding invalidated only Washington’s interpretation of the reach of the federal Establishment Clause. The Court
declined to address the Free Exercise issue. Although this appears
to be an act of restraint, it is an odd exercise of judicial modesty
unless the Supreme Court believed that Washington could indeed
apply its stricter nonestablishment provision without running afoul
of the federal Free Exercise Clause.
The first time that Witters came before the Washington Supreme
Court, that court fully addressed the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. Since the court concluded that the program
was invalid under the federal Establishment Clause, it declined to
address the Washington Constitution’s “far stricter” nonestablishment provision.127 If the Supreme Court believed that there was a
colorable argument that Washington had misinterpreted both of

122

Witters, 474 U.S. at 489–90 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121–22 (Wash. 1989).
124
Id. at 1122–23.
125
Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
126
See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–92 (1953).
127
Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 55–58 (Wash. 1984).
123
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the federal Religion Clauses, there is no apparent reason why it
would have addressed only one of them.128
The most logical explanation for the Supreme Court’s actions is
that while the Washington Supreme Court had incorrectly interpreted the Establishment Clause, it had faithfully applied the Free
Exercise precedents. On closer examination, this seems accurate as
a matter of doctrine. Although Justice Marshall’s majority opinion
did not substantively address Mueller v. Allen,129 five Justices made
clear that Mueller controlled the Establishment Clause inquiry in
Witters.130 In Mueller, the Court upheld a tax deduction for educational expenses, even when the expenses involved sectarian school
tuition, because the benefit was neutrally available and the result
of private choice.131 To the extent that Witters involved an analogous program, Mueller was directly on point, and the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision in Witters misapplied governing Establishment Clause precedent. By contrast, the Supreme Court likely
viewed Washington’s application of the Free Exercise precedents
as essentially correct. The first Witters decision by the Washington
Supreme Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not
require the state to make financial aid available for the study of religion.132 Despite the ripeness of the Free Exercise question, the
Supreme Court did not address the issue in its 1986 decision and
did not grant certiorari on the question in 1989. One can thus reasonably infer that the Court believed Washington had correctly
applied the Free Exercise Clause. If that is the case, the history of
128
One might suppose that the Supreme Court wanted to give the Washington court
an opportunity to construe its nonestablishment provision independently of the federal Establishment Clause. Theoretically, it is possible that the state court on remand
might have interpreted the Washington Constitution to permit inclusion of religious
schools. If the state court had taken this approach and allowed inclusion of religious
options, the Free Exercise question might have become moot. The problem is that the
state court had given no indication that Washington’s nonestablishment principle at
all hinged on the federal Establishment Clause, and the state court had already
opined that Washington’s constitutional provision was “far stricter” than the federal
Establishment Clause. Thus, a decision by the Washington court on remand in no way
would have mooted any potential Free Exercise question that Witters raised.
129
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
130
Witters, 474 U.S. at 490 (White, J., concurring); id. at 490–92 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist); id. at 493 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
131
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398–99.
132
Witters, 689 P.2d at 57.
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Witters would support the notion of “play in the joints”—the Establishment Clause did not prohibit Washington from making financial aid available to students of religion, but neither did the
Free Exercise Clause require an opposite result.
The evidence for a theory of “play in the joints”—Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Sherbert, an extensive discussion of the concept
in Walz (albeit in dicta), and the history of Witters—is far from
overwhelming. Nevertheless, it did enjoy a certain historical pedigree prior to the Court’s Davey decision.
C. Did Davey Faithfully Apply the “Play in the Joints” Theory?
Despite a flurry of commentary in the wake of Davey, few academics have seriously addressed whether Davey faithfully applied
the concept of “play in the joints.” The obvious counterargument
to Davey—that the Free Exercise Clause embodies a principle of
neutrality—has abounded, but only one scholar seems to have met
the Court on its own turf. Professor Manns has argued that the
“play in the joints” theory to which Walz gave voice is legitimate,
but it is moored in the axiom that government must always behave
neutrally with respect to religion. What he terms “true Walz free
play” should govern assessments of whether religious organizations
can participate in government funding schemes. “True Walz free
play” is present when religion motivated neither “(1) the creation
of the subsidized and non-subsidized classes [n]or (2) the assignment of religion to a particular class.”133 When the government creates a general public benefit, it must decide whether religious institutions are sufficiently analogous to the secular institutions that
partake of the benefit. If the religious and secular institutions are
clearly analogous, the benefit should be available on a neutral basis
to all similarly situated institutions. Only when there is a credible
argument that the religious and secular institutions do not share
the same relevant characteristics for purposes of the public benefit
can there be “true free play.”134 Thus, Professor Manns essentially
argues that there is a zone of discretion within which the state may
choose to include religion in a general program or exclude religion

133
134

Manns, supra note 67, at 659.
See id. at 664.
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from the program; however, the zone of discretion is quite limited.135
Professor Manns cites the circumstances and logic of Walz as illustrative of “true free play.” New York had created a property tax
exemption for nonprofit organizations that stood in a “harmonious
relationship to the community” and fostered its “moral or mental
improvement.”136 According to Professor Manns, New York could
have reasonably placed religious organizations in either the favored or disfavored group based on an assessment of whether religious groups met the neutral, secular objectives of the tax exemption. This is “true Walz free play.”137 Underscoring this
interpretation of Walz was the Court’s emphasis on the secular objectives of the tax exemption and the fact that the exemptions neither advanced nor inhibited religion.138 Unlike in Walz, the religionbased classification in Davey violated both prongs of the “free
play” analysis. Religion qua religion was a motivating factor in the
creation of the favored and disfavored categories—devotional theology versus all other majors. With the violation of the first element, attaining the second element of neutral categorization became impossible.139
Professor Manns brings theoretical clarity to the “play in the
joints” debate, but his analysis seems to apply to only one case—
Walz. This criticism may be slightly unfair because Walz, after all,
is the only case to have developed even a semblance of a justification for the “play in the joints” theory. Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Sherbert, the history of Witters, and even Davey itself do little more
than draw on the intuition that a zone of discretion for state action
exists between the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause and
the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. Nonetheless, what
Professor Manns refers to as “true Walz free play” does not appear
to offer a generalizable theory. In Sherbert, Justice Harlan made
clear that, in his view, South Carolina could permissibly create an
135

This interpretation of “play in the joints” seems to address Justice Scalia’s concern that “play in the joints,” as presented by the majority in Davey, would provide no
practical bounds on the state’s authority to discriminate against religion. See Davey,
540 U.S. at 730 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 n.1, 672 (1970).
137
Manns, supra note 67, at 666–67.
138
Id. at 666.
139
Id. at 668.
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exception to an otherwise neutral unemployment statute for Saturday Sabbatarians.140 Although the Court did not decide Sherbert as
a “play in the joints” case, but rather required the state to create an
accommodation, neutrality is arguably lacking—the Court sanctioned facially differential treatment of religion. More tellingly, the
history of Witters indicates that the Court found unobjectionable
the very state constitutional provision that Professor Manns, in the
context of Davey, claims is a violation of “true Walz free play.”
Unlike the neutral benefit scheme at issue in Walz, the Washington
Constitution singles out religion for disparate treatment.
In addition to the fact that Professor Manns’s theory does not
apply to the full panoply of cases in which the Court has advanced
the logic of “play in the joints,” the theory depends almost entirely
on the analytical baseline and the level of abstraction at which the
inquiry is cast. Justice Scalia noted the baseline problem in Davey,
arguing that a generally available benefit is the proper baseline for
assessing whether the state has discriminated against religion.141
Similarly, in Walz the question turned on whether the proper baseline was that all institutions, including religious ones, were subject
to the same property tax regime or, instead, that nonprofit organizations were all eligible for a tax exemption. Without a coherent
theory of which baseline is appropriate, Professor Manns’s theory
can do little work. Furthermore, absent the most explicit animus
toward a particular religious viewpoint, the level of abstraction is
consequential. The Washington constitutional provision calling for
greater separation of church and state, when cast at a low level of
abstraction, mandates differential treatment of religion and
thereby violates the tenets of “true Walz free play.” At a higher
level of abstraction, though, the provision simply seeks to ensure
greater autonomy for the spheres of government and religion.
From an ex ante perspective, then, Washington’s nonestablishment
provision seeks neither to inhibit nor to advance religion.
The theory that Professor Manns articulates has a certain appeal,
but it may not do much work in practice. Although Davey, when
seen through the lens of Walz, may appear to violate “true Walz
free play,” so too do Justice Harlan’s preferred resolution of Sher140
141

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Davey, 540 U.S. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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bert and the result in Witters, which the Court implicitly sanctioned.
A thorough appraisal of the entire line of “play in the joints” cases,
however tenuous they may be, reveals that Davey was not out of
step with the relevant precedents. Admittedly, the precedents are
susceptible to the criticism that Professor Manns and Justice Scalia
level against the theory of “play in the joints”—it has no limiting
principle. The side constraints that Professor Manns posits might
be reasonable and advisable, but the Court has not embraced them
as a general matter. Despite all of these criticisms, as well as arguments in favor of other analytical tools discussed in the following
Sections, Davey’s “play in the joints” logic seems consonant with
the case law.
III. THE FUNDING CASES AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
This Part turns to the last line of precedent—the government
funding cases. In general, the government has wide latitude to fund
those activities that advance its desired policies and to refuse to
fund other activities. An important limitation on this maxim is the
proscription of unconstitutional conditions. A rich literature exists
on the topic,142 but an in-depth exploration of unconstitutional conditions is not necessary for present purposes. Instead, this Part
sketches the basic idea of unconstitutional conditions in order to
provide some context for the two cases most relevant to this analysis, Rust v. Sullivan143 and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.144 Rust
and Velazquez, each involving funding schemes created by the
government, grappled with whether the viewpoint neutrality requirement of the public forum analysis was applicable to funding
cases.
The essence of unconstitutional conditions theory is that “government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
142

See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. L.J. 1 (2001); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1992); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989).
143
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
144
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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withhold that benefit altogether.”145 For the purposes of assessing
Rust and Velazquez, as well as their interaction with the public forum cases, the most important precedent dealing with unconstitutional conditions is FCC v. League of Women Voters.146 The Court
demarcated what the government could legitimately decline to
fund while still steering clear of an unconstitutional condition. Although the government can specify how state funds are to be spent,
it may not place conditions on the recipient’s other, unrelated activities.147 If it is feasible to separate the government-funded activities from other activities that the government does not want to
support, the Court is more likely to sustain a funding restriction.148
In Rust, the Court upheld a provision of Title X that prevented
family planning facilities receiving government assistance from discussing abortion with patients. Much of the Court’s logic rested on
the fact that the activities that the government wanted to fund were
separable from other activities, such as abortion counseling. In
other words, a family planning facility could maintain a “separate
and independent” program that could advise patients about abortion and would remain distinct from the projects benefiting from
governmental aid.149 By contrast, Velazquez held that the Legal
Services Corporation (“LSC”), which received government funds
to help represent indigent clients, could not be subject to conditions preventing LSC lawyers from challenging the constitutionality of welfare laws on behalf of their clients. According to the
Court, differentiating the types of arguments that a lawyer could

145

Sullivan, supra note 142, at 1415. For example, in one of the earliest unconstitutional conditions cases, Speiser v. Randall, the Court held that California could not
condition a property tax exemption for veterans on the swearing of a loyalty oath. 357
U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958). The loyalty oath functioned as an unconstitutional condition
because “[i]ts deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine [veterans] for this
speech.” Id. at 518.
146
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
147
Id. at 399–400; see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (observing that the Court’s “‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a
condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service”) (emphasis in original). In League of Women Voters, governmental support of a
noncommercial television station amounted to only one percent of the station’s income; therefore, the government did not have a right to impose conditions on the entire panoply of activities in which the station engaged. 468 U.S. at 400.
148
See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
149
Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
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make (constitutional versus other challenges) was not feasible,
such that the statutory restriction amounted to an unconstitutional
condition.150 Velazquez’s attempt to distinguish Rust is not convincing, because in both situations the government sought to fund particular activities and permitted the service providers to establish
independent projects that could engage in activities that the government refused to fund.151 Furthermore, the restrictions in Rust
arguably interfered with the doctor-patient relationship at least as
much as the restrictions in Velazquez impaired the lawyer-client relationship. Despite the Court’s efforts to distinguish the two cases,
there is an insuperable tension between Rust and Velazquez.
Judging by the language of Rust, there is no reason to think that
it has anything to do with the government speech or public forum
cases.152 After the fact, though, the Court essentially converted
Rust’s holding into one that pertains to governmental speech.
Rosenberger sought to distinguish Rust, which at first blush might
have seemed to control the inquiry as to whether the University of
Virginia had to fund particular activities. If Rust stood for the
proposition that the government had wide discretion in its funding
decisions, the University had arguably acted within the zone of its
discretion. But the Court in Rosenberger recast Rust as a case in
which the government effectively used private parties to convey its
message,153 an interpretation that Velazquez reaffirmed.154 Despite
the persistence of the Court’s reinterpretation of Rust, the fact that
unconstitutional conditions cases now turn on the speaker’s identity has led to considerable confusion. When a funding scheme is at
issue, the government often seeks to convey no message at all. Rust
150

Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–48 (2001).
See id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152
The Court dismissed the First Amendment challenge in Rust by noting that recipients were not penalized for engaging in certain speech because they could always
have declined the subsidy, and the restrictions applied only to the use of Title X
funds. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199.
153
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust as a case in which “the government disburse[d] public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message”).
154
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on
the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding.”). The Court cited Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), and Rosenberger as examples of the recasting of Rust. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541; see also Kavey, supra note 90, at 753–54.
151

TRAMMELL_BOOK

2000

11/15/2006 7:19 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 92:1957

would appear to be such a case; however, courts must now determine who is speaking—the government or private parties—even
though this may be something of a trick question.155
By treating Rust as a government speech case, the Court has effectively permitted seemingly unrelated doctrines—the public forum and unconstitutional conditions cases—to inform an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of a funding scheme. In Velazquez, the public forum doctrine took center stage and largely subsumed the unconstitutional conditions inquiry. As noted above, an honest appraisal of the scheme in Velazquez probably indicates that, because
of the separability of government-funded and privately funded legal representation, the conditional nature of the government assistance should not have been unconstitutional. Cutting in the opposite direction, though, was the issue of viewpoint neutrality
demanded by the public forum doctrine. While conceding that the
LSC was not an actual forum for the exchange of ideas, the Court
noted that “limited forum cases such as . . . Rosenberger may not
be controlling in a strict sense, yet they do provide some instruction.”156 The Court acknowledged that when the government
speaks, viewpoint discrimination is permissible.157 By contrast, the
government was not attempting to convey any particular message
through the LSC, such that the requirements of viewpoint neutrality still obtained.158
The underlying relevance of the tension between Rust and Velazquez is twofold. First, the conversion of Rust and most funding
cases into speech cases has forced courts to ask misleading and inchoate questions about who the real speaker is, even though a
speaker as such may not exist. The recasting of Rust also obscures
the distinction between true funding cases (arguably Rust is such
155

In his dissent in Velazquez, Justice Scalia took umbrage at the characterization of
Rust as involving government speech: “If the private doctors’ confidential advice to
their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is hard to imagine
what subsidized speech would not be government speech.” Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
156
Id. at 544 (majority opinion).
157
Id. at 541. In Rust, the Court held that the government had not engaged in viewpoint discrimination. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. In light of Rosenberger’s recasting of Rust,
though, it seems more accurate to say that viewpoint discrimination is permissible, but
only if the government itself seeks to convey a particular message. See Kavey, supra
note 90, at 753–54.
158
See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
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an example) and hybrids of funding and speech cases (such as
Rosenberger). Second, and perhaps more importantly, Rust and Velazquez reached diametrically opposed conclusions on the question
of whether the public forum doctrine will apply, by analogy, outside of the forum context. Rust essentially held that in funding
cases, the government has wide discretion, thereby rendering a
public forum inquiry inapposite. Velazquez explicitly acknowledged the value of a public forum inquiry,159 even in the context of
a funding scheme that did not create a forum as such. Both cases
seem highly relevant to Davey, yet the Court failed to mention either one.160 It did, however, appear to resolve the tension in favor
of Rust by emphasizing the discretion that the government possesses when funding particular programs.161 One might speculate as
to why the Court did not mention either case—although the Court
seemed to endorse the “original” holding of Rust, it probably did
not want to acknowledge that Rosenberger had transmogrified Rust
from a funding case into a speech case. Regardless of the Court’s
reasons for not mentioning either Rust or Velazquez, it seems that
Velazquez’s approach of extending the public forum doctrine into
new contexts is now the exception rather than the rule. The basic
principle that the government has wide discretion over funding decisions remains robust.
IV. THE INTERACTION OF THE THREE LINES OF PRECEDENT
While the three competing lines of precedent—public forum,
“play in the joints,” and funding cases—often seem to stand in tension with one another, they can actually exist in a symbiotic relationship and successfully balance competing values. This Part explains how the three lines of precedent can be triangulated and
then uses the example of Davey to illustrate how all three could
have informed that case. Thereafter it examines courts’ receptivity
to this triangulation. The underlying principle of the funding
cases—that government has wide discretion in choosing which programs to fund—is uncontroversial, and only a handful of cases have
159

Id. at 544.
See Laycock, supra note 13, at 179–80.
161
Davey, 540 U.S. at 721 (“The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”).
160
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dealt with “play in the joints” in the wake of Davey; therefore,
those cases warrant only brief mention. The bulk of the analysis focuses on the public forum logic of Rosenberger and how readily
courts have treated Rosenberger as announcing a broad nondiscrimination principle.
A. Triangulating the Precedents
At first blush, one might assume that a broad nondiscrimination
principle is irreconcilable with a theory of “play in the joints” and
the fundamental premise of the funding cases. At least one of the
three lines of cases must seemingly yield to the others. If “play in
the joints” is to have any meaning, and if the state truly has wide
discretion in choosing which programs to fund, then there is arguably no room for a broad nondiscrimination principle. Conversely, if
the nondiscrimination principle governs questions such as those
raised in Davey, then any notion of “play in the joints” apparently
disappears and the state’s discretion over funding decisions is severely curtailed.
Despite the intuition that all three lines of precedent cannot simultaneously govern certain constitutional questions, the principles are reconcilable. As noted in Part I, a broad nondiscrimination
principle is not unbounded.162 Specifically, a nondiscrimination
principle is reconcilable with the “play in the joints” and funding
cases if the principle applies only when the government has created
a generally available benefit. Under funding cases such as Rust v.
Sullivan, the government still has wide discretion to spend money
in numerous ways without creating a generally available benefit.
For example, the government might appropriate money for certain
types of environmental research. The money is quite obviously not
“generally available”—only certain individuals can receive such
funding (such as people with the appropriate scientific qualifications who propose to conduct only the research in which the government is interested). Furthermore, when the government has not
created a generally available benefit, the concept of “play in the
joints” remains robust. For instance, a local government might
adopt a school-choice program whereby parents can select which
public school their children attend. The program arguably does not
162

See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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create a general entitlement to select any school; instead, only children who attend public schools are eligible to participate in the
school-choice program. This is a situation in which the Establishment Clause would not necessarily prohibit the government from
creating a broader voucher scheme that would allow parents and
students to choose from among a wider array of schools, including
private religious schools. The Free Exercise Clause, however, does
not demand inclusion of religious schools because the schoolchoice program is not a generally available benefit. By contrast,
once the government has created a generally available benefit, a
broad nondiscrimination principle would prevent the state from
singling out religion for facially differential treatment.
The facts of Locke v. Davey usefully illustrate how the three
lines of precedent could fruitfully have interacted. Under the funding cases, Washington enjoyed wide discretion in choosing whether
to create a scholarship program. Furthermore, Washington could
have made Promise Scholarships available only to students pursuing certain majors that the state deemed particularly important,
such as mathematics and the hard sciences. If certain majors were
not eligible for Promise Scholarship funding, such as foreign languages or devotional theology, such differentiation would be
largely unproblematic—the government’s choices would need to
survive only rational basis scrutiny (which they almost invariably
could).163 Under the Establishment Clause and the theory of “play
in the joints,” Washington had latitude to put devotional theology
on the list of eligible majors (perhaps alongside education, engineering, nursing, and other more practical areas of study). Again,
the classifications would have to survive only rational basis scrutiny. On the actual facts of Davey, though, Washington had established a generally available benefit—Promise Scholarships were
available to every student who met the income and academic requirements. The only exception was for students of devotional the-

163
One might envision an attempt by the government, in delineating those eligible
for a benefit, to enumerate every category of potential recipients except religious organizations or individuals. Such an exhaustive list that did not include religion might
also violate the nondiscrimination principle. Admittedly, discerning whether the government has generated such an exhaustive list would involve line-drawing difficulties,
but the difficulties would arguably be no worse than those that courts confront on a
frequent basis.
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ology. Once the state has created a generally available public benefit, the broad nondiscrimination principle would require that religion receive equal treatment. One of the most vexing questions under this approach would concern whether the government has
indeed established a generally available funding scheme, but Davey
surely represents the clearest example of a generally available
benefit from which religion, and only religion, was excluded.164
The actual opinion in Davey unsatisfactorily dealt with the three
relevant lines of precedent. Despite embracing the theory of “play
in the joints,” the Court did not satisfyingly engage the idea, remaining silent as to the theory’s history and scope and alluding
hastily to its bona fides. As for Rosenberger and the other public
forum cases, the Court dismissed them as inapposite in one paragraph of a footnote, because the Promise Scholarship Program was
not designed to “encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers.”165 It seems odd, though, that the Supreme Court could so
tersely dismiss Rosenberger since the Ninth Circuit opinion had relied heavily on the logic of Rosenberger.166 Finally, the Court in
Davey did not cite either of the most relevant funding cases—Rust
or Velazquez. From a doctrinal perspective, this is among the decision’s most serious shortcomings, especially because the Court
more or less embraced the original logic of Rust—the notion that
the state has wide discretion when choosing which activities it will
fund.167 An honest appraisal of the funding cases, though, would
have forced the Court to confront and distinguish Velazquez,

164

One might argue that Promise Scholarships were not generally available benefits
in light of the income and academic requirements that students had to meet in order
to be eligible. But given that those requirements were mere thresholds (rather than
guidelines vesting discretion in the government) and that they were irrelevant to the
majors covered by the scholarships, it is fairly clear that Promise Scholarships were
“generally available.”
165
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (internal citations omitted).
166
See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 755–56 (9th Cir. 2002).
167
Although Rust would have provided significant support for the outcome in
Davey, invoking Rust would have forced the Court to reassess Rosenberger’s transformation of Rust into a case about government speech. See supra notes 152–58 and
accompanying text. Absent an actual government message, as was the case in Davey,
the revised understanding of Rust was apparently inapposite. Returning to Rust’s
original holding would have compelled the Court to overrule the reinterpretation of
Rust by Rosenberger and subsequent cases. Perhaps understandably, the Court was
unwilling to do this.
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which explicitly relied on the logic of Rosenberger, even though the
government had not created a true public forum in Velazquez.
Davey presented the ideal case in which the Court could have
balanced the three lines of precedent. It could have acknowledged
the full breadth of “play in the joints” and the government’s discretion to spend money selectively while also indicating that a nondiscrimination principle could actually have teeth. Instead of recognizing a symbiosis between the three lines of cases, though, the
Court allowed the theory of “play in the joints” and, by implication, the funding cases to subsume any trappings of a nondiscrimination principle.
B. Funding Cases and “Play in the Joints” Cases in the Courts
Although the Supreme Court in Davey did not strike the balance
between the three competing lines of precedent in the way that this
Note has argued is feasible, the following Sections consider the extent to which courts have embraced separately each of the three
lines of cases. This Section briefly examines the funding cases and
the “play in the joints” cases, and the next Section turns to the
more controversial issue of whether courts have interpreted
Rosenberger as embodying a broad nondiscrimination principle.
The basic premise of the funding cases is so uncontroversial that
it hardly merits further discussion. As a matter of first principles,
the government clearly has discretion to make funding decisions.
The question that this Note has considered is what limits attach to
the general axiom. Although the notion of unconstitutional conditions has informed the extent of the government’s discretion to
spend money and manage state property, the premise of governmental spending discretion remains strong.168
In the wake of Davey, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
thus far embraced the concept of “play in the joints” and given it
full effect. Writing for a unanimous Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
the only Supreme Court case that has cited Davey, Justice Ginsburg described Davey as “reaffirm[ing] that ‘there is room for play
in the joints between’ the Free Exercise and Establishment
168
See, e.g., Cooper v. Florida, 140 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing, inter
alia, Davey for the proposition that the government does not violate a fundamental
right when it refuses to subsidize that right).
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Clauses . . . .”169 Interestingly, the Court continued to indulge the
idea that “play in the joints” has long informed questions arising
from the Religion Clauses, even though Davey was the first case
that explicitly endorsed the theory. More significantly, the Court
apparently rejected the suggestion by some academics that “play in
the joints” might apply narrowly to the facts of Davey. Professors
Berg and Laycock noted that the Court in Davey focused on the
long-standing tradition of not funding the training of clergy;170 however, Cutter has confirmed their intuition that “play in the joints”
would sweep more broadly.
Lower court opinions have similarly embraced the logic of “play
in the joints.” In holding that the federal government may provide
certain benefits to public school children only, thereby denying
such benefits to children in private religious schools, the First Circuit cited Davey for the proposition that “play in the joints” affords
the government such discretion.171 Earlier this year, the Second Circuit cited Davey for the broader proposition that the City of New
York could seek to avoid even potential Establishment Clause violations without running afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. New
York City’s Department of Education had permitted schools to
display menorahs during Chanukah and the star and crescent during Ramadan but forbidden crèche displays at Christmas. It reasoned that “the crèche conveys its religious message more representationally and less symbolically than the menorah and the star
and crescent.”172 The Second Circuit cited Davey’s invocation of
“play in the joints” and held that the City’s conclusion was reasonable even if it was not compelled by the Establishment Clause.173
In the few years since the Supreme Court decided Davey, the
premise of the government funding cases and the theory of “play in
169

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005) (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at
718). At issue in Cutter was Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, which provided special protection for inmates’ religious exercise.
The Court found that the provision did not violate the Establishment Clause, even
though the Free Exercise Clause did not require such special protection. See id. at
2116–17.
170
Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 250, 252.
171
Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 20–21 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“If any
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.” (quoting Davey, 540
U.S. at 725)).
172
Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 28 (2d Cir. 2006).
173
See id.
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the joints” are robust. The only remaining question concerns the
extent to which courts have construed Rosenberger as announcing
a principle that could extend beyond the context of public fora.
C. Rosenberger in the Courts
Having considered the various arguments and precedents for
discerning a broad nondiscrimination principle rooted in Rosenberger, this Note turns to how the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have actually treated Rosenberger. In many ways the results of this analysis are unremarkable. Almost all of these
decisions have treated Rosenberger as a narrow decision, confined
it to its facts, and cited it only for the most general truisms about
the public forum doctrine. Such cabining of Rosenberger is instructive, though, because it illustrates the Court’s unwillingness to
transform the First Amendment into a set of positive entitlements.
Even if Rosenberger was correct on its facts, a point about which
considerable debate exists, courts have eschewed the notion that it
stands for a broad nondiscrimination principle.
1. Rosenberger in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has consistently endeavored to sanitize
Rosenberger by indulging the notion that it was a public forum case
and somehow not a funding case. Supreme Court cases in which
Rosenberger figured prominently into the Court’s analysis generally fall into two categories: cases in which Rosenberger is directly
on point and cases in which at least one party has invoked Rosenberger as standing for a broad nondiscrimination principle outside
of the public forum context. In the former, the Court has faithfully
applied Rosenberger. In the latter, it has repeatedly observed,
without analysis, that Rosenberger is irrelevant when the government has not created a public forum. There seem to be only two
exceptions to this basic dichotomy—the Court’s rationale in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez174 and several observations in dicta in
Mitchell v. Helms.175

174
175

531 U.S. 533 (2001).
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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Two cases seem to be on all fours with Rosenberger. First, Board
of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth176 was
the obverse of the same coin—an activities fund at a public university. At issue was whether students at the University of Wisconsin,
who had to pay a mandatory student activity fee, could demand the
right not to contribute to organizations espousing viewpoints with
which the students disagreed.177 As in Rosenberger, the Court concluded that the University required students to contribute to the
fund in order to facilitate an exchange of ideas, not to compel certain speech; however, the University did have to distribute the
funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Interestingly, the Court was
cagey as to whether the fund actually constituted a limited public
forum, but it applied the usual standards of the public forum doctrine, focusing primarily on viewpoint neutrality.178 The second
case, Good News Club v. Milford Central School,179 seemed even
more straightforward under Rosenberger. The Court held that a
public school system had created a limited public forum by making
its facilities available and thus could not discriminate against religious groups because such a distinction would entail viewpoint discrimination. In doing so, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed
Rosenberger and asserted that Rosenberger was dispositive of the
case.180 These cases seem straightforward because they involved, respectively, facts that were strikingly similar to Rosenberger and a
classic limited public forum (school facilities). Thus, it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to venture beyond the black-letter
holdings of Rosenberger.
Similarly, the Court has cited Rosenberger frequently for the
general standards governing a public forum analysis.181 In such contexts, Rosenberger does little if any work in light of the public forum precedents that already delineate the forum categories and

176

529 U.S. 217 (2000).
Id. at 222–23, 227.
178
Id. at 229–30 (holding that the “public forum cases are instructive here by close
analogy. This is true even though the student activities fund is not a public forum in
the traditional sense of the term . . . .”); id. at 233 (observing that the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality was the touchstone of Rosenberger).
179
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
180
Id. at 110–12.
181
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673, 690 (1998).
177
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their attendant requirements.182 Good News Club, for instance, involved a physical forum from which religious organizations, consistent with the principle of equal access, could not be excluded. Although Rosenberger was directly on point, it was superfluous in
light of Widmar v. Vincent, the 1981 case holding that certain university facilities constituted a public forum.183 For purposes of assessing conventional fora, Rosenberger seems to do hardly any independent work. Only in situations that possibly invite the
expansion of public forum analysis would Rosenberger actually add
to the Court’s jurisprudence.
The Court has usually declined to extend the logic of Rosenberger beyond conventional fora or funding schemes highly analogous
to the SAF at issue in Rosenberger. In Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, the Court held that when a school allowed one student to offer a public prayer before school football games, the
school district had not created a limited public forum for speech.184
This conclusion seems consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence on
public fora generally—the school district had not made the time
and space generally available. Similarly, in United States v. American Library Ass’n, the Court refused to find that the mere presence
of Internet access in a public library created a public forum for the
exchange of ideas; consequently, the Court deemed Rosenberger to
be inapposite.185
More difficult and novel questions arose in National Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, a case in which several artists argued that the
National Endowment for the Arts (“N.E.A.”) had created a public
forum by making funds generally available to artists, such that
viewpoint-based discrimination was impermissible.186 Finley was the
first case to test the bounds of Rosenberger and, specifically, the
idea that generally available funds could constitute a public forum.
The artists’ argument failed, though. Although the Court’s opinion
was not a paragon of clarity, it signaled that the Court would only

182
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46
(1983).
183
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981); see supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
184
530 U.S. 290, 302–03 (2000).
185
539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003).
186
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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reluctantly find that a funding scheme functioned as a public forum.187 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion emphasized that by establishing the N.E.A. the government did not “indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers’” but instead
sought to promote excellence in the arts.188 By prefacing the quotation from Rosenberger with the word “indiscriminately,” Justice
O’Connor subtly narrowed the realm of funding schemes that
could be considered public fora—only programs intended to foster
a veritable free-for-all among private speakers. The small transformation of Rosenberger’s holding was somewhat surreptitious
because under this formulation the Court probably would not have
found that the SAF in Rosenberger itself was a limited public forum. Justice Souter, the lone dissenter in Finley, would have found
a limited public forum, such that Rosenberger should have controlled the case.189 The other eight Justices made clear, however,
that only when the government has unambiguously and without
reservation created a forum for the exchange of ideas should public
forum logic obtain.
The Court’s unwillingness to expand Rosenberger’s reach has
become a mainstay of its jurisprudence. A few possible exceptions
warrant attention. The only case in which the Supreme Court explicitly extended the logic of Rosenberger to a funding scheme that
did not actually create a public forum is Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.190 Although the Court in Velazquez evinced solicitude for
the approach of Rosenberger and other public forum cases, Velazquez is the exception that proves the rule, as no other case has
embraced the extension of Rosenberger’s logic in this way.191
187

For instance, even though the majority found that the N.E.A. had not created a
public forum, the Court nonetheless took pains to argue that the restrictive criteria at
issue in Finley entailed content-based discrimination but not viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 581, 585. This concern seems warranted if the Court were treating
N.E.A. funding as a nonpublic forum; however, the majority seemed inclined to view
Finley as a funding case only, such that the government should have had nearly unfettered discretion to favor certain viewpoints over others. Justice Scalia argued as much
in his separate opinion. Id. at 596–97 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
188
Id. at 586 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834) (emphasis added).
189
Id. at 600–01, 613 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
191
Despite the invocation of the public forum doctrine, Velazquez almost surely
stands for nothing more than the result it reached. The result probably had more to
do with an issue near and dear to any judge—the ability of lawyers to do their jobs—
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The only other instance in which the Court even intimated that
Rosenberger might be anything more than a public forum case was
Mitchell v. Helms.192 In Mitchell, the federal government distributed
funds to localities, which used the money to lend secular educational materials to public and private schools, including religious
schools. The Supreme Court concluded that the program, as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.193 In a footnote, Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality, addressed a Free Exercise question that the case did not
actually present. “[A]s petitioners observe, to require exclusion of
religious schools from such a program would raise serious questions under the Free Exercise Clause.”194 Justice Thomas cited to
Rosenberger, analogizing the Free Speech question at issue there to
the Free Exercise question that he hypothesized in Helms. The
footnote was clearly in dictum because the statute had not actually
excluded religious schools. Also in dictum, Justice Thomas treated
Rosenberger as standing for the proposition that the government
may not “discriminat[e] in the distribution of public benefits based
upon religious status or sincerity.”195 Although both observations
indicate Justice Thomas’s willingness to embrace the broad nondiscrimination principle that Rosenberger seemed to announce, his
observations appear to be little more than the personal observations of a single Justice. Both statements were dicta made in the
course of a plurality opinion. They hardly portend a doctrinal shift
away from the Court’s consistent practice of cabining Rosenberger
as a public forum case.
2. Rosenberger in the Lower Courts
As one would expect, lower court decisions have wrestled with
the implications of Rosenberger more frequently and extensively
than has the Supreme Court. A thorough review of all the circuit
court opinions that have discussed Rosenberger reveals a pattern
similar to the Supreme Court’s approach. Lower courts most frerather than a judgment about whether the Legal Services Corporation had sought to
foster an exchange of diverse viewpoints.
192
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
193
Id. at 801–03.
194
Id. at 835 n.19.
195
Id. at 828.
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quently cite Rosenberger as standing for general propositions that
are not unique to Rosenberger. Courts have also cited Rosenberger
for several ideas that are specific to the case. For instance, courts
often turn to Rosenberger when assessing the constitutional differences between government and private speech as well as how
courts should understand the exclusion of religious perspectives
from a forum. Many courts have also discussed the language in
Rosenberger that lies at the heart of the nondiscrimination principle; however, the bulk of the opinions have not taken the next step
of applying the principle outside of the forum context. Finally, several cases merit particular attention because they have at least entertained whether a nondiscrimination principle, as discerned from
Rosenberger, is widely applicable.
The first and most obvious truism for which courts have cited
Rosenberger is the evil of viewpoint discrimination in all fora.196
Since at least 1983, when the Supreme Court decided Perry, the
presumptive unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination in any
forum has been clear.197 Consequently, Rosenberger broke no new
ground in this respect. On the other hand, at least some judges
have cited Rosenberger for a variation on the theme of viewpoint
neutrality. Rosenberger observed that “exclusion of several
views . . . is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion
of only one.”198 For example, the Sixth Circuit cited this language in
striking down a state agency’s policy of prohibiting “controversial”
advertising on public transportation, including a union’s message.
Despite the agency’s willingness to exclude both pro- and antiunion speech, the court described this as viewpoint discrimination.199 The fact that most courts do not invoke Rosenberger for
196
See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2004);
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 622 (4th Cir. 2002); DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558,
566 (7th Cir. 2001); Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 350 (5th Cir. 2001);
Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540, 542 (6th Cir.
2001).
197
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
198
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
199
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 361–62 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir. 1997) (Parker, J., dissenting) (citing the same language from Rosenberger and concluding that “[i]f multiple voices are silenced, the debate is simply skewed in multiple ways”).
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such a proposition is unsurprising because the exclusion of multiple
viewpoints might shade into subject-matter exclusions, which can
be permissible in some fora. Frequent citation to this passage in
Rosenberger would thus blur the already tenuous line between
viewpoint and subject-matter distinctions.
The second reason courts often cite Rosenberger concerns the
requirements of a limited public forum. While having to remain
viewpoint neutral, the government may exclude certain subject
matters from a limited public forum if the exclusions are reasonable in light of the character of the forum.200 Again, the idea is not
unique to Rosenberger, but lower courts often draw on Rosenberger’s succinct discussion of limited public fora.201
Third, courts frequently cite language in Rosenberger noting the
murky distinction between subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination.202 To borrow an example from Judge Reinhardt, astrology
might be a subject matter about which astrologers have unique and
divergent views. Alternatively, it might be a viewpoint within the
larger subject matter of the study of the heavens, such that exclusion of astrology would entail viewpoint discrimination.203
The notion of an imprecise boundary between viewpoints and
subject matters is one that courts and commentators have long discussed.204 Rosenberger’s acknowledgment of the point is fairly unremarkable, but Rosenberger did address an important manifestation of the problem: is “religion” a subject matter or a viewpoint?
In nearly every instance, religion will be a viewpoint under Rosenberger. After all, this question was at the heart of the debate between Justice Kennedy, for the majority, and Justice Souter, in dissent. As several lower courts have noted, though, the majority left
200

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
See, e.g., Justice For All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005); Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2004); Goulart v. Meadows,
345 F.3d 239, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2003); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County
Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1297 (7th Cir. 1996).
202
See, e.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 150 (2d Cir.
2004); PMG Int’l Div. LLC v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002); Gen.
Media Commc’ns, 131 F.3d at 281; Grossbaum, 100 F.3d at 1298.
203
Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001).
204
See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1751 (1987); see also
Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 700–01.
201
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open the remote possibility that religion, as an entire subject matter, could be excluded from a forum;205 however, excluding religion
as a subject matter is very difficult. In virtually every forum—even
a limited or nonpublic forum—someone will almost always be able
to address a secular topic within the purview of the forum from a
religious perspective. Thus, religion will be a viewpoint, according
to the logic of Rosenberger, in nearly every forum.206
As discussed in Part III, one of Rosenberger’s principal innovations is the recasting of Rust v. Sullivan as a government speech
case. According to this approach, courts must now assess who is
speaking—governmental or private entities. Lower courts have
drawn on the language in Rosenberger indicating that the requirement of viewpoint neutrality obtains only when the government
funds private speakers. When the government seeks to convey its
own message, it does not have to remain viewpoint neutral.207 Al-

205
See, e.g., Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th
Cir. 2004); DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 969–70; Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 917–18
(10th Cir. 1997). These courts have relied on language in Rosenberger indicating that
religion, as a subject matter, could be excluded from a forum:
By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as
a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts
with religious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also
provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
206
In only one case has a court thoroughly parsed Rosenberger and concluded that a
forum had properly excluded religion as a subject matter. The Eleventh Circuit in
Bannon concluded that an elementary school mural was a nonpublic forum. Bannon,
387 F.3d at 1217. At issue was whether prohibition of a student’s overtly religious contribution was an acceptable subject-matter restriction in pursuit of a legitimate pedagogical purpose. The court decided that, in contrast to Rosenberger, the student in
Bannon sought to communicate an inherently religious message rather than foster a
“discussion of secular topics from a religious perspective.” Id. at 1216. A Ninth Circuit
case, DiLoreto, also purported to decide that religion had properly been excluded as a
subject matter from a limited public forum. DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 969–70. At issue
was the exclusion of an advertisement displaying the Ten Commandments at a high
school baseball game. Although the court said that the excluded subject matter was
religion as such, the court’s language indicates that the excluded subject matter was
actually advertisements that did not solicit business. If this assessment of DiLoreto is
correct, then Bannon is the only lower court decision to find that religion was not a
viewpoint for purposes of public forum analysis.
207
See, e.g., Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 612–13 (5th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Armenti, 247
F.3d 69, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2001); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013–
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though this inquiry might be misguided, particularly when government funding schemes have no communicative elements, lower
courts have faithfully hewed to the dichotomy between government and private speakers.
Among the most interesting ideas for which lower courts have
cited Rosenberger is what this Note has argued is the first step in
finding a broad nondiscrimination principle in Rosenberger. Specifically, Rosenberger rejected the idea that the government could
exclude religion from a public forum in order to avoid a potential
Establishment Clause violation. “To obey the Establishment
Clause, it was not necessary for the University to deny eligibility to
student publications because of their viewpoint. . . . There is no Establishment Clause violation in the University’s honoring its duties
under the Free Speech Clause.”208 Several lower courts have cited
this portion of Rosenberger, which indicates that remaining viewpoint neutral toward religion is consistent with the Establishment
Clause.209 This is the critical first step in locating a nondiscrimination principle in Rosenberger because it means that the government
may not discriminate against religion unless an actual Establishment Clause violation is imminent. The second step, though, involves applying these principles outside of the forum context.
While lower courts have faithfully applied this holding from
Rosenberger, the overwhelming majority of lower courts have done
so only in the context of public fora.
In two rare lower court cases, judges have actually addressed
whether Rosenberger announced a broad nondiscrimination principle. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected such a principle, and a
Fourth Circuit panel did not adopt a dissenting judge’s broad reading of Rosenberger. Probably the most intriguing case to assess
Rosenberger’s implications for Free Exercise jurisprudence is the

14 (9th Cir. 2000); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d
1085, 1094 n.11 (8th Cir. 2000).
208
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46.
209
See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist.,
386 F.3d 514, 530 (3d Cir. 2004); Summum, 130 F.3d at 921; Bronx Household of Faith
v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 220 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d
1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 1996); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth.,
63 F.3d 581, 593–94 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gentala v. City of Tucson.210 The court
concluded that the city of Tucson, Arizona, properly declined to
provide lighting and sound equipment for a National Day of Prayer
event in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, even
though the city had provided such services for nonreligious
events.211 Speaking through Judge Berzon, the court noted the
axiom that government does not violate Free Exercise rights by
denying a subsidy to a religious organization.212 It then distinguished Rosenberger on the ground that Rosenberger did not turn
in any way on the Free Exercise Clause: “if the failure to subsidize
a religious activity . . . violated the Free Exercise Clause, the [Supreme] Court would have said so in Rosenberger and written a very
different, and much shorter, opinion.”213 Gentala argued that the
Free Exercise Clause, though admittedly within the letter of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger, played little if any role in
the Court’s assessment of Free Speech and Establishment Clause
interests. The Ninth Circuit consequently rejected the idea that
Rosenberger could stand for a broad nondiscrimination principle.
The other opinion that grappled with the possible expansiveness
of Rosenberger is Judge Wilkinson’s dissent in Columbia Union
College v. Clarke.214 At issue was the Sellinger program, which
Maryland had established in order to aid private colleges. In order
to be eligible for educational funding, colleges could not be “pervasively sectarian.” Most of the Fourth Circuit’s analysis turned on
Columbia Union College’s eligibility. In a dissenting opinion,
though, Judge Wilkinson argued that since the funds provided by
the Sellinger program were generally available, application of the
public forum doctrine was appropriate in accordance with Rosenberger.215 Although Judge Wilkinson said that the Sellinger program was in fact a limited public forum, this assertion seems imprecise because Maryland had not created a forum for the
dissemination of ideas. Instead, the public forum analysis would
have been appropriate only by way of analogy and on the strength
210

244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Id. at 1067–68.
212
Id. at 1081 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983)).
213
Id. at 1082.
214
159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
215
Id. at 170 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
211
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of the fact that Maryland had made funds generally available, as
the Supreme Court concluded that the University of Virginia had
done in Rosenberger. Judge Wilkinson’s conclusion that a state is
obligated to distribute generally available funds in a viewpointneutral manner seems justified in light of Rosenberger. Nevertheless, his analysis was in dissent, placing him in a distinct minority of
judges and scholars who have been willing to embrace the broad
implications of Rosenberger.
In many ways, lower court opinions have paralleled the Supreme
Court’s treatment of Rosenberger. Most courts have cited Rosenberger only for general propositions about the public forum doctrine. Others have noted the enduring dichotomy between government and private speech. While several courts have observed
that the command of viewpoint neutrality is not inconsistent with
the dictates of the Establishment Clause, courts have been unwilling to apply this logic outside of the public forum context. In fact,
only two opinions have seriously engaged the idea that Rosenberger might have announced a nondiscrimination principle against religion that would apply to all government funding schemes. The
Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected such an approach, and Judge Wilkinson’s willingness to embrace a nondiscrimination principle was
confined to a dissenting opinion. Lower courts thus seem to have
internalized the cabining of Rosenberger.
3. The Future of Rosenberger
The Supreme Court has signaled its unwillingness to extend the
logic of Rosenberger beyond the public forum context, and lower
courts have proceeded in almost lock step. Thus, it does not seem
far-fetched to assert that Davey confirmed the cabining of Rosenberger. Despite this categorical assertion, there is reason to believe
that a nondiscrimination principle may eventually find its way back
into the Court’s jurisprudence. Justice Thomas’s dicta in Mitchell v.
Helms and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Davey indicate those Justices’
willingness to embrace such a principle. Furthermore, then-Judge
Alito’s opinion in Child Evangelism might indicate his inclination
toward a more robust interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.216
216

See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514,
530 (3d Cir. 2004); see also supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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If the Court does eventually move toward a nondiscrimination
principle, what remains unclear is the extent to which the principle
would coexist with the theory of “play in the joints” and the funding cases. As indicated earlier, the competing lines of precedent do
stand in some tension, but they are not contradictory; rather, they
provide meaningful checks on one another. If the Court embraced
a nondiscrimination principle in this light, its jurisprudence would
not necessarily shift dramatically. At this point, though, such inquiries are premature and entirely speculative.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the Supreme Court in Rosenberger
appeared to announce a broad principle of nondiscrimination with
respect to religion. Rosenberger was a unique vehicle for the Court
to stake such a claim, because the case involved a government
funding scheme. Subsequent Supreme Court and lower court opinions have nonetheless cabined Rosenberger as a public forum opinion, with Davey providing final confirmation that Rosenberger does
not in fact stand for any broader principle.
Through a close analysis of the three relevant lines of precedent—public forum, “play in the joints,” and government funding
cases—this Note has sought to determine the robustness of those
precedents and their interactions with one another. As a general
matter, the government enjoys wide discretion when it chooses to
fund, or not to fund, particular programs. Davey confirmed such
discretion while also endorsing, for the first time in an actual holding, the theory of “play in the joints.” The public forum cases, at
least in the immediate aftermath of Rosenberger, would have indicated that a nondiscrimination principle might have functioned as a
check on this otherwise unlimited discretion; however, courts have
refused to extend the reach of the public forum doctrine.
The three lines of precedent offer different modes of analysis
and often look in different directions, but they are not inconsistent.
Although some scholars have viewed Davey as making an inevitable choice between contradictory doctrines, this Note has argued
that the three lines of precedent can coexist. If a nondiscrimination
principle exists in the context of funding cases, it would apply only
when the government has created a generally available benefit.
Such a nondiscrimination principle would then serve as a minimally
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intrusive check on the state’s power to fund projects of its choice.
But at least for now the Court has struck the balance in favor of
deference to state funding decisions, irrespective of any differential
treatment of religion, effectively cabining Rosenberger.

